A PROGRAM FOR ECUADORIAN PHILOSOPHY.

 

Doing philosophy in Ecuador involves a series of challenges that have yet to be overcome. As   a    result,   philosophical    activity    remains   marginalized,   erased    from    university institutions, lacking regular publications that reflect the diversity of its output, and facing precarious conditions for its production.

Therefore, a program for doing philosophy is proposed, which is, of course, a first attempt fraught  with  provisionality.  We  first  need  to  clarify  the  environment  in  which  we  are immersed and which permeates our reflection, even if we are unaware of it.

Next,  We  Attempt  to  Systematize  This   Situation  of  the   Production   of  Philosophical Knowledge in Countries Like Ecuador, Through the Following Considerations:

In the first  part of this  program, we succinctly outlined the conditions  imposed  by the current  social  and  political  circumstances  and  their  potential  impact  on  theoretical reflection; these conditions consist of isolation, lack of communication, and violence.

Next, we  propose  a set  of elements that shape a  potential  horizon  of  meaning  for the Ecuadorian philosophy of the future: returning to metaphysics and recovering onto-theo- teleology, reintroducing critical thinking by returning to a close reading of Marx, showing the need for a certain nihilism that considers the role of negativity in thought, and finally, confronting  ourselves  with  the  historicity  of  philosophical  reflection  by  reconstructing Amerindian thought.

 

I.           Program conditions for a future philosophy. 

1.   Imagine for a moment that we live on a planet with many more time zones than our own.  Imagine that we  live  on the  most  remote  island,  with  a 36-hour time difference from the mainland. Everything arrives here several days late. Let's also suppose that access to this territory has become extremely difficult; there's barely a flight once a year, and ships only dock very occasionally.

This is how we live in Ecuador, despite appearances, mired in a profound isolation caused by violence, poverty, and migration. Stop thinking about those who have a visa and the financial means to leave whenever they want. This is the condition of the vast majority submerged in large slums, trapped in their own homes.

 Therefore, the question of the conditions and methods of doing philosophy in Ecuador, or in any country like ours, takes on its true dimension. In this environment in which we find ourselves  immersed,  is  it  possible  to  think  thoughtfully  and  reflectively?  How  can  one philosophize?

It is not a matter of artificially assuming the representation of those who cannot represent themselves politically or cognitively, as Spivak would say. The existence of this subaltern mass  calls   into  question  any  theoretical  framework  we  develop.  The   philosophy  we develop,  even  if  it  does  not  explicitly  address  the  situation  of  extreme  isolation  and suffering, is nonetheless shaped by this reality.

While we write sitting in a comfortable chair, with the best technology available, probably in a stylish university cubicle, outside the air is filled with cries of pain.

Despite everything, or perhaps precisely because of it, philosophical reflection is essential. We are compelled to think. But how do we find the right way? How do we say what we want to say? How do we break out of isolation and begin a quiet conversation, without fanfare, without trends, without pretension?

2.   Imagine a group of people whose members can only discuss concrete matters with each other. Higher levels of abstraction are blocked. This is certainly not due to the inherent  qualities  of  the  people  on  this  earth.  Rather,  the  barriers  have  been erected from the outside.

So when they want  others  in  their group to  know  how  they  see  the  world,  how  they understand reality, how they organize their conception of the universe, they have to make the  arduous  journey  outside  or  go  to   an  external  mediator.  This   mediator  speaks, interprets, conceptualizes, philosophizes. The others who want to understand the other within their group read these elaborations, and the distorted dialogue, full of "sound and fury," allows for direct connection.

In the philosophy produced in countries like ours, thinkers are forced to rely on external authors and references, those officially authorized to think philosophically. In classrooms and  cafes,  in  texts  and  speeches,  we  communicate  exclusively  through  the  words  of others.

Moreover, the texts produced by those who are closest, perhaps in the classroom next door.

or within the same journal, they are the ones who feel most distant. They don't read each other, they don't comment on each other, they don't discuss each other; and if they do, it will always be indirectly: "Deleuze says, Foucault affirms, Nietzsche already mentioned it."

Sitting at a debate table, in seminars, forums, meetings, philosophers do not look at each other, do not listen to each other, they ignore each other; sometimes someone refers to what the other has said, but only to specify that "Derrida had already mentioned it", or that "It has already been resolved by Guattari in his Chaosmosis".

One's  own  assertions,  in-depth  conceptual  developments,  and  the  implications  of  the viewpoints of those who share the same space disappear, erased  by the dominance of voices from outside, of those philosophies we are obliged to repeat endlessly. Therefore, if someone wants to be heard and read, they must endure exile and return as an established philosophical voice.

Breaking  this  isolation  doesn't   mean  abandoning  classic  or  contemporary  authors.   It means subjecting them to our own scrutiny, compelling them to say what we want them to say, opening ourselves to reading and interpreting the voice closest to us, recognizing their brilliance or their limitations.

Turn your head, open your ears, pay attention to those who philosophize alongside us.

3.   Thinking about violence.  It's difficult to think about violence. We don't  know from where or how to approach it theoretically. As a brutal object, it barely allows itself to be captured, and when we finally manage to grasp it, it tears us to pieces.

The very act of contemplating violence is, in itself, a violent act perpetrated against the one who  reflects  upon  it,  because  one  cannot  approach  it  in  the  same  way  as  one  would approach any other subject.  It compels one to take a stand,  bringing  into  play  not  only ideas   but  also  values,  and  explosively   mixing  thought   and  feeling,   rendering  them indistinguishable.

What is said about violence places the speaker in a particular position, since every truth judgment  is  simultaneously  a  value  judgment.  The  subject  of  the  utterance  is  trapped within it, without any possibility of escape.

The language game surrounding violence is itself violence. To speak of violence is to attack, to cut, to wound. Thoughts become confused and penetrate, like malignant larvae, fear, horror, dread, and trembling. Evil is banal only for the evil. For everyone else, the banality of evil does not exist.

Thinking in the midst of violence.

 To think about violence is to approach the abyss. To think amidst violence is to tumble through the  nine circles of hell.  For  here and  now, this  is our dual condition: to  inhabit violence and to be compelled to think about it.

It should come as no surprise that intellectuals shy away from such a thorny subject. Even in sterile scientific articles, written behind closed doors and with windows shut, one senses the ominous presence of violence, which, blind and deaf, pounds on the ground, calling to us. It is necessary to cover our ears, close our eyes, look the other way, and pretend that nothing is happening.

If we must descend to the ninth circle of hell, whose hand will we take? What perspective must  we  adopt  to  endure  the  unbearable?  For  there  is  no  alternative  but  to  descend, leaving a piece of our soul behind at each level. The danger of succumbing to despair lurks at every turn.

How can we prevent the gangrenous work of despair from affecting both body and mind?

II.          Horizon of meaning for a philosophy of the future.

     4.   Return to metaphysics, recover onto-theo-teleology.

How can we speak of metaphysics? How can we do so when the mainstream leans toward its dissolution or overcoming? How can we articulate being when it has been placed under the confines of onto-theo-teleology? We are constantly led to navigate the aporias that manifest themselves in the program: how can we not speak of being? We quickly arrive at the conclusion that only some kind of negative path is possible: nothing can be said about being.

However, metaphysics abounds everywhere, invading fields of knowledge from physics to the social sciences; it even appears in its most distorted version in esoteric variants that promise  access  to  a  higher  sphere  that  would  drag  consciousness  to  those  otherwise unattainable realms.

The question also arises of the  relevance of  metaphysics amidst a  reality that  urgently demands immediate answers to the magnitude of the civilizational, ecological, economic, and health crises. Is metaphysics merely an abstract knowledge that shuns confrontation with the world? Has the practice of metaphysics become a form of ideology?

On  the  contrary,   it   will   be   argued   here   that   metaphysical   debates   have   become indispensable, both for discussing the multiplicity of approaches and for actually speaking about being, even if in the paradoxical form of saying nothing, or perhaps nothingness. And this is only possible if we want to avoid  nonsense, if that  nothingness, which  has been equated with being, or if you prefer, which conceals being to prevent it from being confused with the entity, is a very talkative nothingness, unable to stop speaking, even if it utters incoherence.

Something can be said about being, and whatever can be said will be metaphysics. We arrive  at  a  situation  with  enormous  consequences,  because  it  is  being  asserted  that something can be said about being and that, therefore, it is far from being excluded from language, without being reduced to a particular entity, even if that entity adopts the form or image of a god. We can say something about being without falling into either a positive or negative theology.

To  establish  an  anti-Kantian  shift  that  makes  metaphysics  possible  and  necessary,  not excluding it from the field of knowledge, but rather grounding all possible knowledge; and placing epistemology within the horizon of metaphysics. It is being that allows access to the thing-in-itself. For this, it will be necessary to unravel the Kantian entanglement of the separation between phenomenon and thing-in-itself.

How can we speak about being without turning it into just another entity like any other, or even into some kind of special, supreme, or transcendent being? Therein lies the task, the challenge.  So,  how  do  we  speak  of  being?  How  do  we  show  that  metaphysics  always returns and cannot be dissolved, closed off, or deconstructed? Metaphysics is there, and it imposes itself upon us. We can either deny its existence, and it will be determining what we think without our realizing it; or we can make it explicit and accept its consequences.

To achieve this, we must break the seal of closure imposed on the onto-theo-teleological. Metaphysics is closely linked to ontology, being to modes of being; teleology allows us to know where we are going, what goals we set for ourselves, what obstacles we must avoid, emphasizing the non-teleological nature of the world; and, particularly in the world we live in, where truth tends to disappear, we must reaffirm reason, taking into account that it will be necessary to specify what kind of rationality we are talking about.

A metaphysics that underpins ontology, teleology, and logos, and that is itself grounded in them. It demonstrates the ontological continuity between being and each of these modes of being. Metaphysics cannot be transcended; nothing lies beyond it. It belongs entirely to this world and not to the hereafter, emphasizing that it is not equivalent to the description of things in their most general sense.

Doing  metaphysics  cannot  consist  of  aiming  for  an  absolute  reduction  of  the  long metaphysical   discussions    that    have   taken    place    throughout   history,   nor   can    it consequently propose their complete overcoming and the restart of a non-metaphysical way of thinking, one capable of speaking without naming being. Nor is it about embarking on some of the fashionable metaphysical currents, such as speculative realism.

Escaping dogmatism and fundamentalist formulations, it will be necessary to engage in dialogue with diverse metaphysics and ontologies, without the intention of constructing an eclectic system. This involves identifying, within each metaphysics under discussion, its concerns,  doubts,  and  impasses.  It  means  doing  metaphysics  by  reflecting  on  how metaphysics has been and is being done.

Travelling these intricate paths, it is possible to find a way that leads somewhere, an oasis in  which  to  stop  and  understand  that  any  point  of  arrival  is  provisional,  that  the statements  made  must  be  subjected  time  and  again  to  debate,  confronted  with  other points of view, questioned in their foundations.

A metaphysics that shows the way to do metaphysics, that has within it the elements for its own representation, that the way in which the being of things is conceived includes the appropriate  orientation  for  the  adoption  of  a  language,  a  way  of  saying,  even  in  the extreme case that nothing has to be said, which would be part of the speaking of being.

Although it is not an ontology of physics, a metaphysics must take into account the latest scientific  findings  and   be  entirely  compatible  with  our  current   understanding  of  the universe, that is, with the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics. For example, the notion  of  nothingness,  insofar  as  absolute  emptiness  is  impossible,  must  serve  as  an indispensable reference point; even more so considering that the interpretation of reality from a physical perspective has become deeply ingrained in metaphysical debates.

With  all  these  elements,  it  will  be  a  drift  in  its  double  sense:  a  slow  and  continuous variation  of  this  metaphysical  endeavor  and  a  departure  from  the  usual,  fashionable notions. Then, we will drift, letting ourselves be carried along by certain currents without knowing beforehand where they will take us, running the risk of shipwreck or arriving at unexpected destinations.

Derrida's  proposal,  now  an  unshakeable  paradigm,  understands  metaphysics  as  onto- theo-teleology and its closure as the fundamental task of all contemporary  philosophy, which would have no alternative but to be deconstructionist, postmodern, posthuman, or any  other  variant  thereof.  Accepting  this   identification  as  valid,  one   must  ask  what happens when we try to leave behind these aspects destined to be overcome.

Is  it truly  possible to  abandon the field  of  onto-theo-teleology? What  remains  if these spheres disappear? What emerges behind them but pure emptiness? In the most radical proposals, it's not simply a matter of finding a higher principle to ground these fields and clarify their constitution. They go much further. They seek to abolish them altogether. Or, at  best,  to  leave  this  sphere  for  inauthentic  beings,  those  who  struggle  daily  for  their survival. Furthermore, it includes a critique of science and technology, which are seen as the cause of great misunderstandings and evils.

However, these  objects  of  metaphysics  are  indispensable  for  understanding  the  world, especially in times of such profound crisis. Let's say that a proper approach to the world as a whole, which would be the core of metaphysics, necessarily includes ontology, theology, teleology, and  logic. This  does  not,  however,  imply  any  stance  on  the  internal  debates within  each  of  them;  it  merely  acknowledges  that  these  metaphysical  objects  demand urgent answers.

Ontology:  In  a  world  so   deeply   permeated  by  new  information  and  communication technologies, biotechnologies, and new materials, within the context of globalization and global  integration,  debating  the  nature  of  each  of  these  realities  becomes  a  constant imperative. For example, what kind of reality are virtual worlds? What are their effects and relationships with reality? Or, what is the impact of biotechnology on the fate of the species? Or, what is reality if quantum mechanics presents an image that doesn't align with  our  daily  experiences?  Are  we  mere  holograms?  Does  time  exist?  Does  freedom exist?

Theology: Day by day we witness how religions spread, becoming increasingly dogmatic and fundamentalist, penetrating all areas of life and knowledge. Even academia adopts a religious style, and any belief quickly transforms into dogma, vying for dominance over all others.  New  gods  emerge  everywhere,  their  secular  appearance  not  diminishing  their nature. On the other  hand, theology, at  least some theology,  proposes distancing itself from   religion,    distinguishing   between    faith   and    belief,    and   thus    preserving   the transcendent without losing its fundamental commitment to people. We must understand the religious phenomenon and, above all, analyze the origins of this profound need for belief, dogma, and fundamentalism.

Teleology:   perhaps    this   is    one   of   the    points    most   attacked    by   deconstruction, postmodernism, and their current versions. It has been said that there are no ends, which implies an exaltation of the present over any construction of the future or openness to any utopia. The hope for a better world is also abolished. Politics is either devastated or transformed into a spontaneous machine of the masses who roam freely through social media. Organization and institutions are what must be combated.  Everything would be destitution, nothing institutional. But never before has a strategic vision of the world been so necessary, without which we cannot confront the crises that overwhelm us. Refusing to propose a teleology leaves the course that humanity follows in the hands of those who have destroyed it.

Logic: two fields have been questioned in proposals to overcome metaphysics: reason and representation, which are certainly intertwined. There would be a privileging of affect, of feelings, over reason; feeling would have prevailed over thinking. The body would have triumphed over the mind and become the locus of truth for subjects, where the processes of subjectivation occur. But, at this moment, what we need is the utmost rationality; for example, in the face of irrationalism surrounding vaccines or the denial of the ecological crisis. While it is true that a thorough critique of science and technology is necessary, they cannot simply be discarded; on the contrary, a radical reaffirmation of scientific facts is required.

On the other  hand, there  is the  issue  of  representation.  Here  too,  presentation  would have  triumphed  over   representation.  Again,   bodies,   images,  and  affects  would   be sufficient  and  would  require  no  representation  whatsoever.  However,  the  defense  of affects  is  carried  out  precisely  through  vast  and  countless  discourses  that  are  nothing other than representations. Never before has there been so much talk about the body and feelings.  Never  before  have  they  been  so  deeply  entangled  in  a  representational  web. Therefore,  the  question  should  rather  be:  What  representations?  How  are  affect  and representation inextricably linked? We must delve into the battle of representations that populate social networks and virtual worlds.

         5.   Marx, in a way.

As long as capitalism exists, Marx will be present in some form. We need a radical critique of capitalism that becomes the guiding principle of philosophical reflection. For this, it will be necessary to rebuild critical thinking, which is currently in crisis.

Critical  thinking  is  besieged  by  the  currents  of  post-truth  and  conspiratorial  attitudes, which become the ideological foundation for the rise of the far right and fascism. Faced with this, we must defend the truth, even if only in the form it can be sustained—as a provisional truth—against the onslaught of irrationality.

That is, to oppose the irrationality of capital with some kind of alternative rationality that points  in  the  direction  in  which  we  must  move  forward  and  that  guides  philosophical reflection, opening it up to the possibility of reconstructing and inventing the meanings that humanity needs.

The significance of Marx's presence has to do with emancipation, with the emergence of a philosophy with  an  emancipatory  interest,  for  which  no  struggle  against  the  countless forms of oppression is indifferent.

An  approach  to  the  various  theories  that  come  from  gender,  class,  race  and  nature, delving into their common forms of constitution, the marks of the inherence of one in another; that is, the impossibility of the exteriority of any of them.

Certainly, reinventing dialectics on entirely different foundations, through a close reading of Marx's work, will allow us to affirm that we are dealing with a Marx who speaks for himself, free from  both  classical  and  vulgar  distortions.  The  results  of  this  inquiry  will provide   the   epistemology    and   methodology    indispensable   for    understanding   and transforming reality.

In these dark times, when truth has fled the public sphere and an anti-scientific discourse, weaponized  by  reactionary  movements,  is  increasingly  prevalent,  it  becomes  urgent  to return to dialectics as a tool for understanding and intervening in social reality. Of course, this   dialectic   also    requires    a   critical    perspective   that   allows    us   to    account   for contemporary phenomena in all their breadth and complexity.

To begin a slow and patient elucidation of the dialectic that Marx uses to account for the fluid movement of capital, its trajectories, and the formation of its laws. This is, above all, a work on language, stating: These are the terms that Marx uses, along with the meanings he attributes to them, as well as the clear preferences whose existence we observe.

 Then, through careful monitoring of the processes of capital, reconstruct the dialectical method that is there in its full operation, considering that Marx subjects dialectics to the needs of the critique of political economy and does  not  hesitate to  move to wherever necessary; for  example,  leaving  behind  any  tripartite  model,  because  the  dynamics  of capital show him that it enjoys splitting itself in a dual way.

Terms, constants, structures, and dialectical  processes will take shape  before our eyes. They will also tend to  repeat themselves  and appear as trends, such as the  persistent question of the personifications of capital or the ways in which representations occur in the consciousness of these individuals.

At  the  end  of  all  these  meticulous  readings,  the  main  findings  will  be  what  we  call dialectical epistemology and phenomenological dialectics. But this is actually an end point, not   a   starting    point.   The    analysis,   on    the   contrary,    will   uncover    each   specific epistemological and methodological element, which unfolds across works and chapters, ultimately yielding a fairly complete picture of Marxist epistemology and methodology.

The need to set aside the classical approaches of dialectical logic, its laws, determinations, schemes of contradiction, the endless references to fetishized and dogmatized phrases, such as the ascent of the abstract to the concrete or the complex is the synthesis of many determinations,  or  the  obligatory  reference  to  Hegel  from  where  everything  in  Marx would be taken, even if inverted, which are not found in Capital or in other of his works.

We prefer a close reading of Marx, focusing solely on what is found there, even if it does not coincide with the canonized version of dialectics. Nor is this a judgment on the validity of later developments of dialectics as they emerged from Engels and Lenin. Rather, we are saying: This classical characterization of dialectics is not found in Marx.

Consistent  with  this  approach,  we  grasp  not  just   the  phenomenon,  but  the  entire phenomenon, even if this means bringing to light dialectical attributes that are practically never discussed in the literature, such as the concepts of form, function, expression, and antagonism, among others. For example, the notion of function and functional is repeated many times in Marx and tends to replace determination. Therefore, if the term function is found in Marx and occupies an important place, it must be explained, rather than hidden or ignored.

6.   A Certain Nihilism.

Dialectical thought inherently involves nihilism as one of its essential and indispensable aspects. The word nihilism resonates in our ears in many ways, carrying with it a wealth of semantic weight and centuries of debate, often with a negative connotation.

Therefore, it is necessary to clearly define what this nihilism emerging from dialectical thought  refers  to,  especially  in  those  aspects  that  differentiate  it  from  tradition  and, above  all,  from   Nietzschean  positions.   First,  we  must  move  away  from  metaphysical debates surrounding nihilism. It is not about being, which in its most abstract form would be  equivalent  to  nothingness;  even  less  so,  is  it  a  path  to  overcome  the  entirety  of Western philosophy.

Dialectical nihilism is historical: the values      and corresponding ways of life that humanity has  adopted  have  not  been  able  to  resolve  its  crucial  problems;  so  far,  no  principle, system,  assertion,  ideology,  religion,  science,  or  anything  else,  has  demonstrated  the capacity to find a way out that will stop humanity from self-destruction. On the contrary, every idea that arises, every theory and practice that is proposed and applied, either leads to  the  opposite  effect  of  what  it  intends  or  ends  up  being  marginal  to  the  planet's problems. And, as we see at every turn, they soon  become  ideologies  that fuel  killing machines, that reintroduce fascism into the world.

Secondly, while it shares with nihilism the rejection of Judeo-Christian civilization, it does not transform nihilism into a moment that is superseded by something else—for example, the will to  power—through the affirmation of values      other  than  those  rejected.  Nor does it elevate nihilism to a status that makes it a metaphysical entity, a fundamentalist “negative value.”

However  important  these  positions  may  be,  dialectical  nihilism  is  far  from  being  a necessary step for evolving, growing, improving, or accessing the truth. It is not a bitter and terrible passage that then casts us onto a paradisiacal shore or, simply, into the raw exercise of power over others, into the will to power.

Dialectical nihilism is a place where one remains, where one must stay, a place that now lacks an exit point that affirms other values      as truths to be believed, to be followed with some kind of faith. And if one temporarily distances oneself from it, one must return.

Therefore, it is considered to have the structure of a double bind: the adoption of values

for which society fights, and the subsequent rejection of these values      to prevent them from becoming fundamentalism, to demonstrate their obsolescence. It involves adopting values     that sooner or  later  must  be discarded, values      we approach with a “strategic essentialism,” but which we ultimately question from a nihilistic perspective.

And this attitude becomes indispensable because we live in a world where any idea, belief, or  practice quickly transforms  into an absolute  principle or value,  always going further than it proposes. This happens even in cases where the values      being preached are just: democracy, ecology,  peace,  animal  rights.  It  suffices  to  mention  the  monstrous  crimes committed in the name of democracy or any other ideology.

It's not about denying the validity of these battles, but about adopting a nihilistic attitude toward them,  because only that will  prevent them from  becoming ferocious  ideologies that destroy all others. Moreover, if any of these groups were to seize power, they would most likely end up as brutal dictatorships.

This  dialectical  nihilism  reveals  the  essential,  structural  limitations  of  any  value  in  two dimensions:  those  that   originate  from   outside,   insofar   as   no   value   is   capable   of representing  all  of  humanity  in  the  vast  diversity  of  its  manifestations,  demands,  and challenges. The defense of any value, however just it may claim to be, inevitably excludes other equally just values.

The limitations that are inherent to it and that end up manifesting themselves from its very beginning; as Fredric Jameson points out, there is not only that which opposes, confronts, and contradicts a phenomenon, as part of the negative moment of dialectics, but there is also that other negativity within any reality or value, which comes from within, which is constitutive of it and which will lead to its destruction.

This dialectical nihilism extends to the global order, questioning the ways of life not only of the West but also of the East, the North and the South, and of emancipatory movements of all kinds. I insist that it does not seek to renounce liberation struggles against all forms of power, but rather to expose the inherent negativity they contain, which, once in power, has taken control of the process, transforming it into its very opposite.

 This is a historical position, rather than an absolute stance on the human condition. So far, no value put into practice has managed to solve humanity's problems; on the contrary, they have proven to be killing machines.

The  dialectical  perspective  reveals  nihilism's  twofold  negativity:  on  the  one  hand,  that which is external to it, and on the other, that which is inherent to it. Every phenomenon faces external conditions that threaten its existence, its development.

Within this externality, two modes can be distinguished: that which stems from another phenomenon  without  a  direct  relationship  to  the  reality  in  question;  and  that  which originates  within  the   phenomenon  itself,  excreting  it  and   placing  it  out  there,  as  its opposite, as its contradiction. The work of the dialectic in nihilism is dedicated to unveiling this other inherent, internal negativity of the phenomenon, which, sooner or later, will end up destroying it, regardless of the actions it undertakes.

or stop engaging in external contradiction.

From  this  core  come  the   limitations  of   life  forms,  their  destiny  that   leads  them  to obsolescence, to the impossibility of becoming general principles that solve the problems of humanity.

This second negativity that dialectical thought reveals is not the negative moment of a positivity that returns, overcome and realized, in a third moment—a kind of negation of the   negation—that   yields    an    unprecedented    positivity    supposedly   resolving   the contradictions of the previous moments. This negation does not lead to a solution, but to destruction, decomposition, and barbarism.

No   reality   can   escape   this   inherent   principle   of  self-destruction   that   shapes   and constitutes it, a principle it cannot even dispense with. Dialectical nihilism has the task of making  explicit,  with   respect  to  all  forms  of  life,  their  values,  and  their   beliefs,  this destructive principle that resides at the core of existence.

Once this zero degree of  negativity  is  brought  to  light,  it  must  be  confronted.  Various possibilities exist, which must be resolved according to the specific situations; however, some courses of action could be followed.

To insist on this inherent negativity and take it to its ultimate consequences in order to make  it  explode  through   its  dismissal;  to  guide   it  to   its  full  realization  so  that   it  is exhausted and disappears; this may be the case, for example, with the relationship to be established with postmodern art and with other canons in the West. To take canonical or fashionable artistic trends to their fulfillment; there it will be seen that they have nothing more to offer, that it is time to discard them. Parody or pastiche could play an important role here.

To combat these self-destructive negativities and prevent them from contaminating the rest  of  society,  to  properly  deconstruct  them  by  externalizing  the  principles  of  their operation  or  the  consequences  they  would  lead  to  if  their   movement  were  to   be completed.  For  example, to  analyze  how  the  decolonial theory of cultural studies,  if  it were  to  gain  power  in  any  country,  would  quickly  acquire  a  dystopian,  dictatorial dimension. That is, if the political presuppositions of decolonial theory—which contain this self-destructive negativity—were extracted, we would have a brutal dictatorship.

Maximum  awareness  and  control  of  one's  own   negative  tendencies   inherent   in  the discourses  and  practices  one  holds;  sooner  or  later,  the  positions  held  will  ultimately reveal the barbarity that underlies them. At some point, one will have to "disagree with oneself," probably at the moment when others begin to agree with one.

Dialectical nihilism attempts to show this movement of transformation as something that, nevertheless, allows one to remain true to oneself.  Underlying this are ontological and methodological questions that must be brought to light.

If we allow these transformations, which in almost all cases are imposed upon us, to act without  further  ado,  if  we  leave  them  to  their  own  devices,  the  world  we  enter  will destroy  ours;  that  other  culture  will  consume  ours  without  residue;  for  example,  by turning it into a multicultural object of mass consumption.

Two  sequences  can  be  distinguished  within  the   dialectical  transformation:   first,  we become others, we become Western and modern, better than they do, fully; we take late modernity  as  our  task:  we  fight  for  democracy,  for  human  rights,  against  hunger,  for peace, against the destruction of the planet, more radically than they do.

 Secondly—and  this   is   the   nihilistic   gesture—we   draw   the   practical   and   discursive consequences of the inadequacy of this late modern way of life, of its outdated values, of this   “civilization’s”    inability   to    solve   the   crucial    problems    it   has    created.   Thus, democracy—without any embellishment—even the  best of it, ends  in authoritarianism; dictatorial elements already  reside within democracy itself; indeed, as we  have seen in recent decades, there is a continuum between these democracies and fascist elements. We fight for democracy, but it is not enough; it will not give us the answers we need.

This dialectical nihilism, as political action and representation of the world, allows us to recognize in the actions of the masses those prefigurations of another way of life that they invent,  always  provisionally  and  precariously—those  ephemeral  particles  that  emerge from nothingness and then plunge back into nothingness. It is up to us to reflect on them, to theorize about them, to find ways to ensure their continuity. We must be guided by these glimmers, which are soon displaced by other "lights": the great mass mobilizations of   our   century   that  were   "betrayed"   and   that   led   to   authoritarian   governments, dictatorships, and civil wars.

This  is a  double-bind strategy,  in which we oscillate  between  defending these  modern values      and, at the same time, knowing that we have to leave them behind, to replace them with something else. While this is happening, we go from one extreme to the other, negotiating the forms and timing of our practices and our discourses.

However, another major issue needs to be addressed. How is this nihilistic gesture, which denies a way of  life along with  its values,  replaced?  What  is the  nature  of these  other values     that are invented or proposed?

And  here,  nihilistic  consciousness  and  attitude  continue  to  operate.  From  a  dialectical perspective,  nihilism  is  not  something  one  can  escape  or   leave   behind.  There  is  no dialectical  moment  of  overcoming  it;  rather,  it  implies  a  negativity  in  which  one  must remain, inhabit. And this is not a choice. It is simply the historical fact of living in the era of late capitalism and that humanity has not found a way out of it. In this sense, dialectical nihilism is not metaphysical, a kind of relationship between nothingness and the hidden being.

Thus, a value that replaces another—or that intends to do so—must be subjected to this same dialectical nihilistic machine: we enter into that value, we fight for it, we represent the world through  it;  and,  simultaneously,  we  show  the  zero  degree  of  negation  that externalizes those elements that make it self-destructive regardless of the external factors that oppose it.

There is no will to power that affirms “life” and allows for the replacement of man by the superman; rather, there is a will to power that is always exercised over others. Even when affirming life, the will to power is always a will that demands the obedience of others, a machine  of oppression. There  is  no  exteriority  to  this  machine;  no  situation  or  theory exists  that   stands  outside  of  it,  regardless  of  its  origin,  even  if  it  comes  from  the essentialized Global South, anti-globalization movements, or alternative epistemologies.

7.   Amerindian Thought.

While the primary task is to bring Amerindian ontologies to light, the aim is to avoid falling into  the  trap  of  relativism,  which  would  merely  acknowledge  the  existence  of  these worldviews.  On  the  contrary,  the  question  of  the  validity  of  these  ontologies,  of  our understandings of reality, is a constant underlying issue.

This point is particularly relevant in the current civilizational crisis we are experiencing, due to the ecological disaster, the risk to humanity as a species posed by the pandemic, the failure of capitalism to solve humanity's major problems, the breakdown of daily life, and the explosion of subjectivities. All of this leads us to the immediate choice between socialism and barbarism.

Reflecting on Amerindian ontology aims to consider the possibility of alternative realities, other  ways  of  existing   and   relating  to   one  another,  and  the  constitution   of  worlds different from the  one we  inhabit.  I  believe  that  one  of  the  essential  components  for formulating a world beyond capitalism will be that which stems from Indigenous thought and ways of life.

It's  not about  romantically finding all the answers,  but at  least  it will  point the way to finding  the  right  proposals  for  our  times.  These  aspects,  along  with  other  equally important  ones  such  as  the  critique  of  political  economy,  epistemological  debates surrounding  science  and  technology,  current  software  and  biotechnology,  allow  us  to obtain a new vision of the future.

It will be essential to develop a thorough comparison and confrontation of Amerindian thought with the main Western philosophical currents, to engage them in a cannibalistic, hacker-like approach, to examine them from this  perspective and correct them. At the same time, we must learn from them, avoiding falling into the exoticism of the “absolutely other” that  has  hindered  this  dialogue  and  debate,  and  instead  compel  us  to  think  of humanity as a species, humanity in its universality, without discarding local perspectives.

Ultimately, what is at stake right now is the future of humanity, which includes the brutal question: will there even be a future? The future lies ahead, and it will be up to all of us to decide where  it  is  led.  We  must  move  away from visions  of the  automatic  collapse of capitalism, which will  not  happen,  and  from  pessimisms  that  simply  foretell  a  greater catastrophe.

In this context, much can be learned from Amerindian thought by freeing ourselves from the limitations imposed by academia or by the proliferation of speculations—many with a clear  New  Age  slant—that  have  frozen  Indigenous  ontology  into  a  series  of  endlessly repeated formulas. Rethinking the Indigenous world and asking ourselves: What aspects remain valid? What proposals need to be developed to adapt them to the modern world? Which   images   are    perhaps   too   local   and   specific?   Which    images   of   reality   are generalizable and which are not?

Where would an ontology of others be stated or announced? Certainly in nuce, in all these developments.  However,  a  direct and  rigorous  reflection  on  the  ontology  of  others  is necessary. We must avoid falling into the trap of the discourse that maintains there is no indigenous  ontology  because  this  category  is  strictly  Western.  But  we  have  no  other categories with which to think, so with these, there is an approach to that different world, forced to express what it finds in another reality, and then there remains the enormous task of redefining ontology as well as all the findings discovered.

It is certainly possible to state: there is a Western ontology and an ontology of others. This statement does not hold up in terms of its truth, that is, its agreement with what exists. Here  we   have  a  completely  exclusive  disjunction:  either  one  or  the   other,  with   no possibility of a middle ground, of coexistence, neither conflictive nor peaceful. We have opposing ethics that are in constant conflict. In ontology, there is only one that is the best possible truth at this given  moment; the other  is  necessarily  wrong, false, or does  not correspond to what exists.

Ontology  shuns  relativism  to  the  same  extent  that  it  shuns  dogmatism.   Relativism  is impossible   because  one  cannot  say  the  same  thing  and  its  opposite  about   reality simultaneously, under the same aspect. Dogmatism is also impossible because ontology is never complete; it is always an approximation of what truly is. Or, to put it another way, there will always be a better theory than the current one.

The  image  that  the  ontology  of  others  reveals  will  be  incompatible  with  the  ontology currently considered canonical in the West, insofar as they refer to incompatible worlds, because   they   posit    completely   different   and    irreconcilable   subjects,    objects,   and relationships. Archaeology and anthropology, the sciences that  underpin this  reflection, cannot escape, and do not wish to escape, their disciplinary boundaries. They advance to the point of showing that there is a multiplicity of ontologies, all with an equal degree of validity, but they stop short when it comes to contrasting them with reality and comparing them with one another. Despite these pronouncements, a relativistic bias remains.

Postulating an ontology outside the traditional frameworks of philosophy is  particularly difficult, because words barely suffice to express what one seeks to say, because what one wants to express perhaps occupies the provisional space of the inexpressible. There is a constant   struggle   with   the   chosen   words:   perspectivism,   occasionalism,   planes   of consistency, discordance of times … all touch upon an aspect of what one wants to state, but there  is still  no single term that allows  us to articulate this  new ontology with the desired precision and rigor.

It is not merely a matter of linguistic difficulties, but of the barely perceptible existence of another   possible  world,  an  embryonic,  fragile,  and  difficult-to-recognize   mode  that disrupts the relationship between word and object far more often than we would like, and allows  those  meanings  we  try  to  avoid  to  slip  in  through  the  window:  relativism, essentialism, dogmatism, dualism.