CRITIQUE OF IMMANENCE IN DELEUZE AND GUATTARI

 

To clarify the concept of immanence as much as possible, it is necessary to review the positions of Deleuze and Guattari, which have been a reference point for the development of various fields of knowledge, such as debates on semiotics, political economy, and ontology. (Althusser, 2002) (Fontanille, 2015) (Zinna, 2016)

I will take the text What is Philosophy? in which this concept is developed and which will serve as the basis for other works of theirs, such as A Thousand Plateaus. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1993) (Deleuze and Guattari, 2002)

The critical thesis that is upheld points to the inadequacies of the proposal by Deleuze and Guattari, hereafter DG, in failing to correctly resolve the relationship between the planes of immanence and their manifestations, which causes the surreptitious entry of that which they want to avoid: transcendence.

The starting point takes philosophy and turns it into a plane of immanence, inhabited by concepts. From the outset, the question of immanence is linked to the infinity capable of including all philosophical notions.

Yet they resonate all the more, and the philosophy that creates them always presents a powerful, nonfragmented Whole that remains open: an unlimited One-All, Omnitudo, which includes them all in one and the same plane. It is a table, a plateau, a slice. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 35)

The development of the relationship between concept and plane of immanence is framed by the idea that "the problem of thought is infinite speed, but this requires a medium that moves infinitely within itself: the plane, the void, the horizon. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1993, p. 39) The unstoppable unfolding of concept-generating thought requires the existence of a medium that allows it to sustain and organize itself.

Concepts are absolute surfaces or volumes, formless and fragmentary, whereas the plane is the unlimited absolute, formless, neither surface nor volume but always fractal... the plane is the abstract machine of which these assemblages are the working parts. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 36)

The relationship between an infinity originating in its endless multiplicity and the infinity of the immanent plane, which escapes any determination or definition and approaches a negative theology: absolute, unlimited, formless, dimensionless, yet curiously fractal. Here we begin to see the irresolution of the problem of immanence, when that which was believed to be excluded penetrates once again through that immanent plane defined in transcendent terms. 

A negative theology that describes the plane of immanence with theses reminiscent of the definitions of God in Neoplatonism: "The plane of immanence is not a thought or thinkable concept, but the image of thought, the image that gives itself of what it means to think"; this is formulated in terms of the timeless forms through which God imagines reality through the Word. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1993, p. 41) But how can we say anything about the plane of immanence if it is neither thought nor thinkable? We can only be left with the infinite image that escapes conceptualization; moreover, with an image that the plane of immanence makes of itself and that does not correspond to any representation expressed in concepts.

So the plane of immanence is the object of an infinite specification—so much so that it seems to be the One-All only in each case determined by the selection of movement. This difficulty concerning the ultimate nature of the plane of immanence can be gradually resolved. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 39)

Infinity, as the medium in which concepts are created and unfolded, undergoes processes of "infinite specification" which, in Neoplatonic terms, would be called multiple emanation, thus achieving the finitude of concept production. We are faced with a theophany of the plane of immanence. 

Following this Neoplatonic drift, DG introduces a highly risky gesture, which approaches the exaltation of irrationality,” barely rational", and comes close to endowing the plane of immanence with a quasi-mystical experience, through which we are transported to intoxication and excess.

It is precisely because the plane of immanence is prephilosophical and does not immediately take effect with concepts that it implies a sort of groping experimentation, and its layout resorts to measures that are not very respectable, rational, or reasonable. These belong to the order of dreams, of pathological processes, esoteric experiences, drunkenness, and excess. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 41)

In the Kantian manner, DG describes the errors into which thought falls when it disregards this immanent conception of philosophical endeavor. A series of illusions are created: transcendence, universals, eternity, and discursivity.

First of all there is the illusion of transcendence (the double illusion that makes immanence immanent to something, and rediscovering transcendence in immanence itself). Next there is the illusion of universals... Next there is the illusion of the eternal—when we forget that concepts have to be created. And finally there is the illusion of discursiveness—when we confuse propositions with concepts. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 49)

At this point, we arrive at the most contradictory part of the text, which ends up falling precisely into what it is trying to avoid. In other words, the text becomes trapped by the very illusions it denounces. Immanence yields ground to transcendence, despite all efforts to think of it in terms of diagrams and the intensive nature of concepts, issues that will be explored at length in A Thousand Plateaus, with the intention of resolving the difficulties raised in What is Philosophy? 

Conceiving the plane of immanence as infinite, absolute, and undetermined, the object of an exceptional experience excluded from rationality and discourse leaves the door open to the entry of transcendence. Illusion of transcendence. 

This chaotic and fractal infinity, which emanates on many planes, is, at the end of the process of encountering concepts, the universal medium in which they move and through which they exist and communicate. Illusion of the universal. 

The plane of immanence escapes empirical determinations; it is located outside concepts. Although it is not defined as eternal, it is timeless, lacking spatial and temporal dimensions, like a kind of pure form that allows concepts to exist within it, even though it is not itself a concept nor is it conceptualizable. Illusion of eternity. 

Finally, the illusion of discursivity. After all, even if it is through negative theology, DG manages to intuitively express the truth of the plane of immanence, not because it is thinkable, but because we feel its presence as a philosophical ether modulating the movement of concepts. 

In this way, DG's text leads philosophical reflection into a dead end; there, the question of immanence and its relationship to transcendence remains unresolved. Instead of avoiding a return to transcendence, it causes it to become the horizon that makes all thought possible.

Bibliography

Althusser, L. (2002). Para un materialismo aleatorio. (P. Fernández Liria, Ed.) Madrid: Arena Libros.

Deleuze y Guattari. (2002). Mil mesetas. Valencia: Pre-Textos.

Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1993). ¿Qué es la filosofía? Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama.

Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (2016). What is Philosophy. Edinburgh : Edinburgh University Press Ltd.

Fontanille, J. (2015). Formas de vida. Lima: Fondo Editorial de la Universidad de Lima.

Zinna, A. (2016). El concepto de forma en Hjelmslev. deSignis, 25, págs. 121-134.

 

 

IMMANENCE IN ALAIN BADIOU

 

Alain Badiou refers to the term immanence in his latest book in the trilogy Being and Event, entitled The Immanence of Truths. The challenge is to construct a system defined by this term and, at the same time, introduce infinity into it. The condition that makes this theory extremely difficult to achieve is the impossibility of resorting to God and spiritual solutions, because it must avoid straying from the immanent plane. For Badiou, transcendence, of whatever kind, is excluded from the outset. (Badiou, Being and Event 2003) (Badiou, Logic of worlds 2009) (Badiou, The inmanence of Truths 2022)

How can immanence and infinity be reconciled without developing a system explained causally by transcendence? Badiou insists on refusing to renounce either of the two aspects that make up reality. Retaining only immanence will lead to some variant of empiricism and relativism. Appealing to transcendence will be a return to theology.

The question of truth brings the two terms, immanence and infinity, to their maximum tension. Badiou starts from a strong defense of the universal character of truths, that is, their infinity, without which we would fall into relativism. A truth must be valid for everyone to be such.

My starting point, which, as always in philosophy, is also the point that must be demonstrated and justified, is that, on the one hand, there are truths, i.e., existents that have universal value and significance… (Badiou, The inmanence of Truths 2022, 26)

On the other hand, truths are collective and individual products; they belong entirely to the public sphere and are subject to all social and political constraints. Put this way, it seems to deny the universal nature of truths.

Universal truths are immanent to real worlds because they are created in them. Created by God, Descartes said. Naturally, I will bring things back down to earth: truths are created by a human subject—personal or impersonal, individual or collective —in particular worlds, with particular materials… (Badiou, The inmanence of Truths 2022, 26)

The formulation of the dual requirement shows the negative consequences that would arise if we chose to position ourselves at either extreme: “Indeed, one must fight against the skeptical or relativist stance, which is: “There are no universal truths; everything is relative,” but also against the dogmatic stance, which is: “Truths have existed from time immemorial in a transcendental, external form”. (Badiou, The inmanence of Truths 2022, 27)

In order to find a solution to the dual demands of immanence and finitude, without resorting to transcendence, Badiou explores three meanings of immanence and, in the end, demonstrates their full articulation. First, truth as historical fact and paradigm of immanence. All truth is a social product, determined by a here and now.

First of all —and this is the basic sense that I just referred to—every truth is an immanent production within a particular world, that is to say, within a historico-geographical world, localized in time and space. “Immanence” is very classically opposed here to “transcendence.” (Badiou, The inmanence of Truths 2022, 27)

In the second type of immanence, Badiou begins to outline a possible resolution to the tension between immanence and infinity. Even though it arises from the world, truth is not imprisoned by historical conditions. Truth is considered to be beyond the situation, and its exceptional nature comes from its universality. Therefore, it comes from the immanent sphere and from there reaches a type of infinity.

However, —and this is the second sense—a truth is also an exception to the world in which it is created, quite simply because it has a universal value. Indeed, even though it is produced in a particular world, it retains its value when it is transported, transmitted, translated, to other possible or actual worlds. (Badiou, The inmanence of Truths 2022, 27)

In this second type of immanence, Badiou appeals to the immanence inherent in infinity, in truths with their absolute character:

The second, which is my position and the only one I know of that enables the continuity of philosophy, proposes a concept of truths whereby their relationship to the absolute is based neither on the One nor on some kind of transcendence. This, then, is the second sense of immanence: truths are in an immanent relationship with the absolute significance of their own value.  (Badiou, The inmanence of Truths 2022, 27)

Having eliminated the resource of transcendence, Badiou has no alternative but to discover within infinity itself, in this case that of truth, its immanent character. The first type of immanence lies in the social character of the production of truth; the second type, on the other hand, enunciates an immanent relationship that is internal to truth itself.

Once truth has been produced from the social matrix, the value of truth belongs solely to truth itself, because truth, in its infinity, transcends the first immanence. Absolute truth cannot be contained within empirical immanence, because it would tear it apart; therefore, it moves to the level of an immanence that is self-referential. The value of truth is immanent only to the sphere of truth, even though its origin is social; this allows it to have an "absolute meaning".

Badiou's central argument is in this part and follows the following sequence: collective production of truth, excess of truth with respect to the conditions of its production, constitution of the sphere of immanence of truth, and realization of the relationship between finitude and infinity.

The relationship between immanence and infinity occurs between these two immanent spheres, even though the immanence of truth has been produced by historical immanence. For this very reason, truth as absolute and universal returns to the world and constitutes itself as the truth of that world.

I will therefore show that the evidence for this immanence of the absolute is provided by the infinite value of a truth. A truth always testifies to the possibility of an immanent relationship between the finite and the infinite.  (Badiou, The inmanence of Truths 2022, 27)

The third type of immanence is the concretization of the relationship between the two types mentioned above, which occurs through a process of subjectification. The subject, both social and individual, becomes an emergent property of the immanent spheres as the bearer of truth. Thus, to be a subject is to be a subject of truth and, by this means, to access infinity from finitude. Truth is not external to the subject but is also immanent to it. One could speak of an inherence of truth in the subject.

Finally, the third use of the word “immanence” stems from the fact that an individual’s or a group’s becoming-subject depends on its ability to be immanent to a truth procedure. To be a subject, to become a subject, is another form of immanence, the immanence to a truth procedure and therefore also to the relationship with the absolute underpinned by every truth. (Badiou, The inmanence of Truths 2022, 27-28)

Badiou summarizes this entire process as follows:

“The immanence of truths” has this threefold sense: the immanence of the production of truth to a particular world; the immanence of a truth to a certain relationship between the finite and the infinite as a sign that it touches the absolute; and the immanence of any subject thus constituted, above and beyond its particular individuality, to a truth procedure. (Badiou, The inmanence of Truths 2022, 28)

It is worth asking whether Badiou effectively resolves the problem of immanence in its relationship with infinity. Although he rejects the appeal to a transcendent God, the difficulty remains due to the existence of universals that have an absolute character. It is difficult to accept this thesis without further ado, because when another plane of immanence is formed, that of infinity, it does not cease to be infinity as such, and underlying it is a certain aroma of transcendence, even if it is in its secularized form.

Furthermore, the processes by which the sphere of historical immanence produce absolute universals that immediately expel them from its world are left unexplained. How does this very special kind of product arise from finitude and become infinite? How does finitude inherently contain infinity?

The resolution of this difficult question does not come from denying the problem as such. We are faced with the production of universals, including truth, which, although they are historical products, are surplus to the situation in which they were produced. Otherwise, we would be faced with the triumph of relativism and skepticism. However, the mode of existence of the sphere of universals, which are also immanent to their own field, is not elucidated.

If we want to escape from such a world, in which there are only relative beings or, as I put it in Logics of Worlds, only bodies and languages, a thorough critique of the thesis of finitude must be undertaken. Infinity must be shown to be a real and required resource, as a guarantee of everything relating to truths having a universal value. (Badiou, The inmanence of Truths 2022, 28)

Badiou's text leaves the challenge open, and a solution will have to be found while recognizing the validity of the way it is formulated; that is, it is not enough to construct a totally immanent system, because it leaves aside that other sphere, whose recognition is inevitable. In this sense, attempts such as those of Deleuze and Guattari, and Manuel de Landa fail in their endeavor. (DeLanda 2006) (Deleuze y Guattari 1994)

Bibliography

Badiou, Alain. 2003. Being and Event. London: Continuum.

—. 2009. Logic of worlds. London: Continuum.

—. 2022. The inmanence of Truths. London: Bloombsbury.

DeLanda, Manuel. 2006. A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity. London & New York: Continuum.

Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1994. What´s Philosophy? New York : Columbia University Press.