The
path to a definition of the notion of form necessarily passes through Plato,
who places this theme from the beginning of his works and will progressively
give it a central role in his philosophical system. Reflections on form
inevitably return to this matrix, so it is necessary to take a position on its
conceptions. The approach made in this work does not intend to reconstruct the
endless debates around Plato, an impossible question given its breadth. For
this reason, it focuses exclusively on establishing, in a synthetic way, the
nucleus of Plato's theory of form, which serves as an input for its
contemporary elucidation.
I
take as a reference two current reflections that I consider to shed light on a
correct way of understanding the Platonic form: the relationship between form
and essence, as proposed by Vasilis Politis; and the transformations that form
undergoes in Plato's last dialogues, especially in the Parmenides and in
The Sophist, analyzed by Cordero.
In order to contextualize these visions of Plato, one can consult the
work of Larsen and Politis.
The
first sentence of Politis's text enunciates the central thesis of his work,
around which his interpretation of Plato will revolve: form and essence are the
same; that is, essence is form. This argument is based on the understanding
that the essence asks about the ti esti, what is it? and does not
attempt anything other than to answer this question.
The topic of the present study is Plato's theory of Forms, as
it used to be called. The thesis of the study is that Plato's Forms simply are
essences and that Plato's theory of Forms is a theory of essence – essences, in
the sense of what we are committed to by the supposition that the ti esti
('What is it?') question can be posed and, all going well, answered. This
thesis says that the characteristics that, as is generally recognised, Plato
attributes to Forms, he attributes to them because he thinks that it can be
shown that essences, on the original and minimal sense of essence, must be so
characterized.
Although
this thesis is clearly based on this correct sense of essence, which inquires
about what a thing is, or what makes a thing what it is, it leaves its
relationship with form unanswered. Why does the fact of asking about the
essence mean introducing the question of the form? The conclusion that follows
from this reasoning is that the question of essence is equivalent to the
question of form. In other words, answering the what a thing is means
recognizing the form behind it as its essence. Everything that exists is formed
in some way.
This
relationship between form and essence can be clarified by clarifying that
essence gives itself in beings as form; thus, discovering its essence is the
same as recognizing the form that makes it what it is; that is, the essence has
this formative function. It is assumed that, insofar as entities have an
essence, they simultaneously possess a form. Moreover, the conclusion resulting
from this reasoning leads to the expression that, if everything has an essence,
then everything has a form. The formless, just as non-being, as will be seen
later, exists in a relational way; that is, this reality is formless with
respect to this other reality; but, in itself, it is not.
This
question of the identity between form and essence is evident when looking at
any object in daily life, in which answering the question of what it is is
generally simple; However, when it comes to questions such as goodness, truth,
beauty, and justice, the question becomes very difficult. In these cases, we
are required to make extensive and in-depth considerations to answer the
question, and the answers given are always disputed. Thus, the form of justice
requires a careful investigation to know what its essence is.
If there is one thing that Socrates, as Plato represents him,
is convinced of, it is that the ti esti question, especially when asked of
certain things or qualities, such as beauty, equality, unity, justice, is a
most important and profoundly difficult one, the answering of which is a major undertaking
and requires demanding enquiry.
Once
this first consideration has been given, which intersects essence, form and the
question "What is it?", Plato demands that the answer to this
question be unitary and explanatory. These two necessary requirements refer to
a much more complicated problem, which arises from the existence of the
multiple, in respect of which the essence is unity; that is, entities that
share the same essence and that, for this reason, are the same, similar or
belong to the same field of phenomena without necessarily being identical.
If
we observe that one reality p has the essence r, and that another reality q has
the essence r, and so on with a series of objects, we must admit that several
realities may have the same essence; but this essence does not arise by means
of inductive procedures, but goes beyond the concrete fact; and, therefore, The answer through the exemplar to the
question what is it becomes insufficient; in the same way, the question "What
is color?" is not solved by saying that this object is red or green.
The essence of color covers the set of all colors.
In
addition to their unitary character, essences must have an explanatory
character. The essences that make a thing what it is are enough to make it
possible for that thing to be what it is. The essence gives the entity the
attributes and characteristics that make it what it is: "Plato associates further
substantive requirements with the This is you question; in particular,
the answer to the question must be unitary, and it must be explanatory".
The
next step that tends to be taken almost automatically is to interpret Plato
following Aristotle's elaborations; the essence is quickly linked to the
substance; but we must remain in the direct definition of essence, as a form
that makes a thing what it is, without presupposing or conferring existence on
that of which it is essence: "For it follows from this that, against a
common understanding of Plato's Forms, we have no reason at all to suppose that
Forms are substances that have essences; all we have reason to suppose is that
they simply are essences. I shall conclude the present study with this result
and add that this shows that Plato's Forms are not self
As
Politis points out, the discussion at stake here lies in sustaining the
possibility of a theory of essence that does not include a definition of
substance and that presupposes the existence of a first principle, from which
everything else originates; therefore, it is necessary to rescue the possibility
of a different path from the Aristotelian one: "To assume this is to
assume that there can be no theory of essence except in combination with a
theory of primary being and the view that the primary beings are substances: a
monumental assumption.".
For
a configuration of the sense of essence and form, this aspect will be crucial,
especially because it allows the use of the notion of essence by removing the
substantialist burden that is placed on it; even more, affirming the need for
the correct use of the term essence, as we can see in authors such as Marx in
the analysis of the form-value as foundation and essence, and in Spivak with his
strategic use of the term essence. Therefore, the full validity of a
non-substantialist essence, which allows the understanding of the same or
similar phenomena, can be sustained; otherwise, reality would dissolve into the
difference. Essence as form explains both sameness and difference.
The
question of forms, as essences that they are, is conceived in Plato in a
differentiated way depending on the type of things that are being dealt with.
Four spheres are distinguished: those things like unity and plurality, and
justice, goodness, and goodness, which are independent of sensible perception,
and which, in fact, cannot be grasped by the senses, but only by reasoning. We
cannot observe the good, the truth, or the justice, because they are not a
quality of sensible things; We can establish that a fact is just or unjust, but
there is no justice as a universal. And the other two, which are certain
attributes such as water or fire, and what are later called accidents, which
are attached to things and cannot be separated from them.
In putting this question to Socrates – the question of
whether, in regard of certain things, there are separate Forms of those things
– Parmenides distinguishes between four sorts of things in regard of which this
question can raised: i. Things such as likeness and unlikeness, unity and
plurality: Are there separate Forms of those things, that is, separate from
sense-perceptible things that are like or unlike each other, or that are
unitary or not unitary? ii. Things such as justice, goodness, and beauty: Are
there separate Forms of those things, that is, separate from sense-perceptible
things that are just or good or beautiful? iii. Things such as water, fire or
human beings: Are there separate Forms of those things, that is, separate from
sense-perceptible fire, water and human beings? Finally, iv. Things such as
mud, hair, and dirt: Are there separate Forms of those things, that is, separate
from sense-perceptible mud, dirt, and hair?
Of
course, Plato does not arrive at the conception of forms that produce forms,
although he has to admit that concrete things have forms and that these can be
pointed out to answer the question What is it? This aspect of form
theory will come much later, especially from the hand of George Spencer
Brown. Rather, it is recorded the
variety of essences and the diversity of their relationships depending on the
type of entities with which we are dealing, including those ideal principles
such as goodness, truth and justice.
The
theory of the Platonic form, thus formulated, still poses challenges for its
understanding and, above all, for its contemporary use. Politis points out the
main characteristics of the form:
Forms are changeless, uniform, not perceptible by the senses,
knowable only by reasoning, the basis of causation and explanation, distinct
from sense-perceptible things, necessary for thought and speech, separate from
physical things.
At
this point, it is interesting to deal with the first characteristic, because
taking it as it is formulated, it leads to an unacceptable metaphysics, because
it transforms the essence into something fixed and separate from reality, and
could lead to it being interpreted as a substance: Forms are changeless. I
return to the approaches of Néstor Luis Cordero, in order to analyze the
changes that the theory of form undergoes in Plato, in the Parmenides and,
especially, in the Sophist, which provide a distinct image of the form
and introduce into it the possibility of movement and change.
The
problems arise in Plato at the moment in which he tries to explain those
aspects that are not compatible with the monistic vision derived from
Parmenides, because the contrast between being is and non-being is not seems
insurmountable: sameness and difference, unity and multiplicity, truth and
falsehood, reason and sensibility, among others. In the final analysis, how can
we explain that there are things that are, how can we say of something that is
not, that it is?
Plato
enters fully into the development of an ontology, maintaining the fundamental
finding of essence as form, and its non-substantialist character. The passage
from what is to what exists and how it exists, implies radical
transformations in its conception of form. In this context, Plato explicitly
formulates the relationship between form and being, because he discovers the
form of being; or, in other words, that being is a form.
Ext. — The former, slipping into
the darkness of non-being, actsin combinationwith it, and it is difficult to distinguish it because of the
darkness of the place, is it not?
Teet. - It seems so.
Ext. -The philosopher, on the other hand, always relating
himself to the form of being by means of reasoning, alsopoco
is fáIt is easy to perceive, this time because
of the luminosity of the region.ón. The eyes
of the soul of most people, in fact, are incapable of striving to look at the
divine. (254a)
In
Cordero's terms, "the philosopher is an 'ontologist', an expert in the
Form of Being, to the point of being 'clinging' to it", and this will be a
crucial finding, because it allows, at the same time, to resolve the
difficulties of a fixed form and confer movement on it, and, on the other hand,
being as a form, to participate fully in its characteristics. Plato thus
arrives at an ontology of form.
Being
as a form has the capacity to communicate; In fact, communication is the way in
which being gives existence to that which only had essence. The communicability
of forms breaks his isolation and prepares him to fully explain the reality
before him, such as the existence of movement and rest, or of unity and multiplicity.
Ext. —Since it has been admitted that some genders agree to
communicate with each other and others do not, that some do so with a few and
others with many... (254b)
Conferring
being is, above all, a movement of communication between forms; moreover, in
the beautiful words of Cordero, communicates existence: "The Form
of Being, as was the case with the Form of the Good, is functional, it does not
have a precise essence (such as beauty, justA
little girlñez): it is purely dynamic, it
communicates existence".
Participation,
which is another fundamental characteristic of forms, makes possible the
relationship between elements that, otherwise, appear to be totally isolated
and without the capacity to interrelate. In this way, the crucial question of
the relationship between the intelligible and the sensible would remain
unresolved. The ability to communicate includes participation; that is, the two
planes participate in the form of being and, through it, manage to
communicate.
Either Form participates, or it does not exist. And since the
capacity to communicate (to act or to be affected) concerns everything, on pain
of not existing, there is no longer any distinction – as we have seen – between
the sensible and the intelligible. Through participation and presence, the
sensible and the intelligible participate in many ways.tumente;
thanks to communicationóNot recíproca
the Forms communicate with each otherí
(selectively, lólogically) and, without the need
to justify it, since PlatóI didn't always admit itó, the sensible communicates with the sensible.
Plato
is finally confronted with the problem of non-being, since he has admitted that
non-being exists in some way. If being is sameness and non-being, what is
different, what does non-being consist of? It insists on maintaining
Parmenides' thesis that non-being is not; but a nuance is introduced that
alters Parmenidean monism and opens it to the understanding of negativity.
Ext. — We must admit, then, and without getting angry, that
change is the same and not the same. When we say that he is the same and not
the same, we do not speak in the same sense, but we affirm that he is the same
when we refer to his participation with the same in himself, and when we say
that he is not-the-same, we allude to his communication with the different,
thanks to which he separates himself from the same and becomes not the
former. but in something different. In
this way, it is also correct to affirm that it is not-the-same. (256ab)
If
it is maintained that non-being is not, what is it that is named as the
non-same, that is, the non-being, the different. Plato introduces the
relational variant of non-being: there is no such thing as non-being in
general, but there are things that are not. In order that this may not lead to
a contradiction, it is interpreted as one thing that is not in relation to
another, although it, by itself, has its own essence. Thus, the non-white only
exists in relation to the white, and could not be sustained in isolation.
The main consequence of the Foreigner's comment on the carácter “relative” of the Different (for nothing is Different in itselfí; A t is neededéThe term of
comparison) will be the confirmation of the only predicative value of the
non-being that will be reached... As Bluck (1975: 148) observed: "Cases of
Difference are necessarily relative [relational] and, consequently, the
Different in itself, qua paradigmatic norm [standard], is necessarily relative
[relational]"
The
turn incorporated by Plato allows, at the same time, to save Parmenides'
premise, being is and non-being is not, and, on the other hand, to
establish the mode of existence of things that are not. From a certain
perspective, something can be said to be not, but only in relation to something
that is. Negativity arises in opposition to a positivity that, as such, is
already given. Thus, falsehood is the denial of a truth; but, if it were
completely isolated, it would be meaningless.
The implications
for the debates on nothingness, as a metaphysical resource that is repeated
throughout the history of philosophy, reveal the absolute impossibility of
nothingness; and that any discourse around it should be considered as the
negation of everything that exists. Nothingness by itself is meaningless and
nothing can be stated or predicated about it; on the other hand, it is possible
to have a discourse or to endow it with a function if it is opposed to the
given, effectively existing reality. This is the value of nihilism; and the
marking of the limits of the apophatic pathways.
Synthetically,
the findings of Plato's theory of form are:
|
The essence answers the question :
what is it? And this is the core of its definition. |
|
Essence is a form. Form and essence are
the same. |
|
The use of the term essence does not
imply a substantialist conception of reality. |
|
On the ontological plane, being is form:
a way of being. |
|
The main characteristics of the way of
being are communicability and participation, which resolve the question of
being and non-being; and, therefore, of movement and rest, unity and
plurality, sensible and intelligible. |
|
The essence answers the question :
what is it? And this is the core of its definition. |
|
Non-being is not; but there are things
that are not. This non-being of things occurs only in relational terms.
Non-being as such does not exist; something is not with respect to something
that is, as its negation. |
These
elements must be taken into account, debated and transformed, in order to be
integrated into a general theory of form, which is contemporary and which
accounts for the current demands of this theory; For example, how can these
Platonic considerations of essence and form be incorporated and redefined if
form is claimed to be the introduction of a distinction? Can it be maintained
that essence is that which introduces a distinction?
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