COMMUNICATING THE FORM IN CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE

 

In the last writings of Charles Sanders Peirce, a new element is incorporated into the tripartite semiotic scheme of sign, object and interpretant, which is form. This modification adds this significant element and functions as an opening to new fields of inquiry, especially to elucidate the action of form in the processes of semiosis.

I will refer preferably to two of Peirce's late works: Manuscript 793 and Letters to Miss Welby.  In these works, semiotics shifts from the treatment of the sign as representation to the sign as communication. It is a prioritization of the communicative fact rather than an erasure of representation. (Peirce, The essential Peirce: Selected philosophical writings, Volume 2, 1893-1913, 1998)

In Peirce's later writings he focused on the notion of communication as an essential feature of all semiosis, not only the sign as a medium of communication between two minds, but also the sign as a medium within the sign relation, which communicates a form from the object to the Interpretant. (Alrøe, 2025, pág. 8)

Communication does not exhaust the field of action of signs, although it is now considered as the central axis of semiosis. It is in this context that Peirce places the notion of form as part of the communicative process and the exchanges of information.

The general function of signs is to communicate ideas; this is equally true of thoughts, imaginary signs that convey ideas from the self of the past to the self of the future, as it is of the signs used in external exchanges of information... However, this does not mean that semiosis would be exhausted by communication as it is ordinarily understood. (Bergman, Fields of signification, 2004, pág. 247)

Studies tend to focus on this transformation of semiotics and the question of form is treated in a very marginal way. This remains a term of automatic understanding without further elucidation, as if it were evident that what is communicated is the form. In this sense, we do not enter into the debates of semiotics but concentrate on the role that form plays in the communicative process of the sign and on the consequences for a full understanding of the notion of form, which allows its use beyond the sphere of semiotics.

Before entering fully into the texts that refer to form, it is convenient to keep in mind what dynamic objectives and dynamic interpretants are, since they are integrated into the processes of communication, where form appears. The immediate object, part of the triad of sign, object and interpretant, is subsumed in the dynamic object and is now understood as a partial, incomplete moment of that dynamic object, which is found when the communication is already given or concluded.

The dynamic object fulfills two essential functions for semiosis: it establishes a sequence of signs and intertwines them in such a way that none of them are isolated, that is, it builds a chain of signs; and, once this has been given, it is integrated into a system of signs; only when these two movements are complete does the object attain its full significance.

The dynamic object is, in some senses, the object that generates a chain of signs. The aim of a sign chain is to arrive at a full understanding of an object and so assimilate that object into the system of signs. Using slightly more simplistic terms, Ransdell (1977, 169) describes the dynamic object as the "object as it really is", and Hookway (1985, 139) describes it as "the object as it is known to be [at the end of inquiry]".  (Atkin, Peirce’s theory of signs, 2023, pág. 9)

In turn, the dynamic interpretant follows the movement of the dynamic object. Once we have the dynamic object, then a level of understanding is reached; for this reason, it is affirmed that this interpretant corresponds to the interpretation that we have effectively arrived at in each communicative situation.

The dynamic interpretant, then, is the understanding we reach, or which the sign determines, at any particular semiotic stage. To continue with linguistic examples, we know that the dynamic interpretant is the actual interpretation we make, or understanding we reach, in the first instance of interpretation.  (Atkin, Peirce’s theory of signs, 2023, pág. 11)

Let us now see how the form is located in this brief context that has been outlined. In Manuscript 793, in Note 22, Peirce introduces the term form as part of the semiotic process of communication: "For the purposes of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium for the communication of a Form."  (Peirce, The essential Peirce: Selected philosophical writings, Volume 2, 1893-1913, 1998, pág. p. 544 n. 22)And in the letters to Welby: "I use the word 'Sign' in the widest sense for any medium for the communication or extension of a Form (or feature)."  (Peirce & Welby, Semiotic and significs: The correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby, 1977, pág. 196)The terms with which it is necessary to deal clearly appear: sign, medium, communication and form. The fundamental premise is also enunciated: what is communicated is the form; or in its variants: a form of the object is communicated; a formed object is communicated.

The need for the presence of the form that completes the triad and that makes all communication possible originates in those quasi-minds that present themselves as forms capable of indexing, concretizing or expressing themselves in a diversity of manifestations. The type of form that communicates is manifested through various tokens. The shape would be a type that is indexed in its tokens.

It is not logically necessary that anything possessing consciousness, that is, feeling of the peculiar common quality of all our feeling, should be concerned. But it is necessary that there should be two, if not three, quasi-minds, meaning things capable of varied determination as to forms of the kind communicated. (Peirce, The essential Peirce: Selected philosophical writings, Volume 2, 1893-1913, 1998, pág. p. 544 n. 22)

The sign is the carrier that carries the form from the object to the interpretant; that is, from the dynamic object to the dynamic interpretant in such a way that it closes the circle of communication. In this sense, form is the content of communication. To put it more rigorously, the content that goes from the object to the interpretant is always the form of the content; or a content formed in a certain way, through which it maintains its unity and makes possible a varied indexing.

That which is communicated from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant is a Form... The Form that is communicated does not necessarily cease to be in one thing when it comes to be in a different thing, because its being is a being of the predicate. (Peirce, The essential Peirce: Selected philosophical writings, Volume 2, 1893-1913, 1998, pág. p. 544 n. 22)

The fact that the form is embodied representatively means that it produces the specific communicative effect, producing the closure of the communicative act, allowing it to be effective and for the dynamic interpretant to understand not only the immediate meaning but the complete meaning of what is being communicated.

In the Sign the Form may or may not be embodied entitatively, but it must be embodied representatively, that is, in respect to the Form communicated, the sign produces upon the Interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object itself would under favorable circumstances. (Peirce, The essential Peirce: Selected philosophical writings, Volume 2, 1893-1913, 1998, pág. p. 544 n. 22)

The two aspects of semiosis, representation and communication, are fully realized in the communication of form. Behind the communication process there is necessarily the sign as representation that, in this new approach, is subsumed to the dynamics of communication. Perhaps because of this crucial role given to form, Peirce associates it with the truth of the proposition.

The Being of a Form consists in the truth of a conditional proposition. Under given circumstances, something would be true... The Form is in the Object, entitatively we may say, meaning that that conditional relation, or following of consequent upon reason, which constitutes the Form, is literally true of the Object. (Peirce, The essential Peirce: Selected philosophical writings, Volume 2, 1893-1913, 1998, pág. p. 544 n. 22)

Peirce probably goes too far with this statement, which, moreover, is not expanded or substantiated. Rather, it would be preferable to say that the communication of form opens up to the veritative sphere of the proposition, which can be true or false. As Umberto Eco says, all semiotics has to be able to explain both truth and lies: "In that sense, semiotics is, in principle, the discipline that studies everything that can be used to lie." (Eco, 1976, pág. 22)

The form is the result of the duality of the sign, which represents the object and, at the same time, continues to refer to the sign in its function of representation as such. This means that there is  representational content, but there is also the form, which refers to the sign as soon as it connects it with the object.

Indeed in what we may, from one point of view, regard as the principal kind of signs, there is one distinct part appropriated to representing the object, and another to representing how this very sign itself represents that object. The class of signs I refer to are the dicisigns.(Peirce & Welby, Semiotic and significs: The correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby, 1977, págs. 196-197)

In the example given by Peirce, the object is clearly distinguished as meaning and the relationship established between them, "he is in love with", as the form that the relationship between John and Helen takes. In this way, the form immersed in the process of semiosis is the one that gives a concrete content to the object of the sign, uniting representation and communication in a single step, making the dynamic interpretant apprehend the dynamic object.

In 'John is in love with Helen' the object signified is the pair, John and Helen. But the 'is in love with' signifies the form, this sign represents itself to represent John-and-Helen's Form to be.(Peirce & Welby, Semiotic and significs: The correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby, 1977, págs. 196-197)

Although the form, coming from reality or fiction, is independent of communication, it cannot do without the sign in case it wants to communicate, which includes its representation. When the sign catches the form, the form becomes the object of the sign. Semiosis makes the form, which is independent of communication, the object of the sign, precisely in order to be able to communicate it. Only when form enters the semiotic process does communication take place, which necessarily becomes communication of form.

The Form (and the Form is the Object of the Sign), as it really determines the former Subject, is quite independent of the sign; yet we may and indeed must say that the object of a sign can be nothing but what that sign represents it to be. (Peirce & Welby, Semiotic and significs: The correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby, 1977, pág. 197)

Upon entering the semiotic field, forms acquire this status of signifying forms and for this reason, they can be communicated by the sign to an interpretant: "On the other hand, Peirce also suggests that the object is similar to an utterer in that it functions as a "repository of ideas or significant forms".  In addition, the social or collective dimension is introduced, because these signifying forms have a common substrate, which implies that the production of both forms and meanings occurs within the framework of common experience.(Bergman, Fields of signification, 2004, pág. 251)

Furthermore, in the same passage Peirce introduces the peculiar (and rare) concept of commens, which may be characterised as the common ground requisite in order that any communication can take place. It seems to be a different way of saying that the sign interpretation requires collateral experience, the stress being laid on a common or shared acquaintance with the object. (Bergman, Fields of signification, 2004, pág. 413)

 

Bibliography

Alrøe, H. (2025). The six types of sign action. Semiotics. DOI:10.1515/SEM-2024-0112

Atkin, A. (2023). Peirce's theory of signs. (E. Zalta, & U. Nodelman, Editors) Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/

Bergman, M. (2004). Fields of signification. Helsinki: University of Helsinki.

Eco, U. (1976). Treatise on General Semiotics. Barcelona: Lumen.

Peirce, C. (1998). The essential Peirce: Selected philosophical writings, Volume 2, 1893-1913 (Vol. 2). (Peirce Edition Project, Ed.) Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Peirce, C., & Welby, V. (1977). Semiotic and significs: The correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby. (C. Hardwick, & J. Cook, Eds.) Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Reyes Cárdenas, P. (2018). Scholastic realism: A key to understanding Peirce's philosophy. Peter Lang. doi:10.3726/b11107

 

 

IMAGEN/PALABRA EN HUELLADEGÜELLA DE LIZ LUIS QUIROGA

 

La relación compleja entre imagen y palabra se extiende a lo largo de los siglos. Épocas, corrientes, estilos, modos de vida privilegian la una o la otra. Disputas interminables entre la iconodulia y la iconoclasia, porque al final de cuentas los iconoclastas terminaban por privilegiar la palabra revelada junto con la prohibición de representar lo divino a través de ídolos. De hecho, gran parte de la posmodernidad ha sido iconoclasta en el sentido de desvalorizar la imagen y dar preeminencia al concepto, muchas veces vacío contenido, e incluso con rasgos calvinistas.

Sin embargo, nos alejaremos momentáneamente de estos debates indispensables para tratarlos a partir de un caso, en el que veremos cómo se da la relación entre imagen y palabra, y específicamente entre imagen y escritura. Una relación que contiene a más de sus referentes directos, una clara alusión al eidos y al logos, ya que en último término se trata de esto. Si se quisiera nombrar con propiedad este enfoque podría denominarse: Eidoslogos. Eidos como pensamiento e imagen, y logos como razón y palabra. El cristianismo como religión de la palabra señala con igual insistencia, desde el inicio, que somos hechos a imagen de Dios, pero que esta hechura ha sido llevada a cabo por la Palabra. Esta dualidad persistente acompañará a la civilización occidental hasta nuestros días.

La serie de relaciones que se dan entre palabra e imagen, sobre un texto radicalmente experimental como es Huelladegüella de Liz Luis Quiroga, inédito. No se trata meramente de ilustrar el texto con una imágenes; o, si se prefiere, la conversión del texto en imagen es, estrictamente hablando, un proceso de Ilustración; esto es, de apertura hacia un mundo de las luces y del conocimiento, a más de la construcción de un doppelgänger estético.

En la Figura 1 se observa, como el aspecto relevante, la elección de la estética del pastiche y del grafiti, que son aspectos que, antes de leer el texto, orientan la interpretación que se le dará; esto es, previamente a la comprensión de las palabras, la imagen ya coloca los significados en un contexto marcado por la cultura popular urbana, cercana de las visualidades del rock y del metal. (Todas las ilustraciones son de Liz Luis Quiroga, excepto la Figura 1 que es del diseñador Christian Velasco).

La deconstrucción de la figura clásica, la Gioconda, anuncia el tipo de trabajo experimental que se realiza sobre el texto, que se desliza hacia la ruptura y estallido de los significados corrientes y conocidos, para dar paso a la destrucción y reconstrucción de otros sentidos que antes no estaban presentes en el español.

 

    Figura 1.

La estética del pastiche y el grafiti no se quedan en el exterior de la textualidad; por el contrario, sus elementos plásticos penetran en la sintaxis, que llevan a un cierto nivel caótico del lenguaje, pero que, si se presta suficiente atención, terminan por inventar nuevas palabras y significados, ampliando de este modo el campo semántico del español.

en donde te has metido mona lisa acelerada en la casa queda nadie, intenflexiones tropicálidas sintagpramáticas diacánicas escritura glotopaladial antesignificante presemémica morfeómica se meiosis monstruismo redondancia frase siseo con mucho swing a la Saussauge a la arbitraria

Este texto de Huelladegüella describe bien el conjunto de transformaciones en la gramática estándar, desde luego, con un dosis grande de humor, sin el cual no puede ser entendido a cabalidad. Así, el conjunto de tropos se transforma en intenflexiones tropicálidas, la semiosis se convierte en se meiosis monstruismo, que recuerda la partición de las células y la posibilidad de los monstruos, sin dejar de afirmar que todo esto finalmente puede reducirse a un truismo, Saussure aparece como un tipo de salsa Saussauge y queda claro que el texto entero tiene ahora mucho swing.  

Tomemos otro fragmento de la obra de Liz Luis Quiroga:

te deseso mucho te cepillo el xexo del otro xenofília el amor siempre es recíporco te deseso me decesas en dónde fallamos ¿en Valencia? yo te reciproco tú me reciprocas yo te tú me pulsióname aquí ¡quanta nece.si.dad nescio fallócrata! procrastíname ¡déjame para más tardecito! desovíllame desóvame, amárguese que no es foco, álvvvvvvaro todavía duermes laureal despierta Imogen tenemos un im.pase, ¿análisis interminhado? noto noda notu noya en mi espalda tu imogen subliamada, en mi espada tu imagen recortada calibre colt 45, deseo subprime te recuerpo te vengo de improviso te llego de sorpresa

De este texto con claras referencias freudianas, que difícilmente podría trasladarse a una sola imagen, se extraen dos palabras nucleares que sintetizan su contenido: pulsióname y fallócrata, Figura 2. Se produce una primera segmentación con sus consecuencias: ruptura de la linealidad del texto y, por tanto, de su secuencia, aislamiento de determinados significados. De este modo, están listos para trasladarse al plano estático de la imagen y a la percepción intuitiva de esta y de sus contenidos.

Figura 2. Pulsióname Fallócrata,

La imagen resultante no trata de erigirse ella misma como autónoma; por el contrario, depende claramente del texto: sin embargo, su tarea, en este caso, es permitir de manera inmediata la percepción de los términos colocados en un determinado contexto. Más que evadir el concepto, la imagen la desplaza para aclararla y para encontrar en ella las posibilidades de la concreción de su significado.

El Pulsióname Fallócrata remite en el texto a la matriz freudiana de las pulsiones, pero aquí son convertidas en la posibilidad de una acción externa. Alguien desde fuera introduce una pulsión y esto, desde luego, ya suena mucho más a Lacan que a Freud. Luego se nombra a aquel que me pulsiona, que no es otro que un falócrata patriarcal, aunque el significante se desplaza para permitir la aparición de la principal característica del falócrata, y de cualquier sujeto masculino: siempre falla. Falo y falla se fusionan en una sola palabra.

A su vez la imagen permite, de un vistazo, encontrarnos con estos significados, antes de ponernos a reflexionar de manera analítica sobre ellos. Pero, la imagen está lejos de quedarse en el traslado pasivo de los contenidos experimentales del texto y elige un mundo en el que esta frase tiene lugar y, desde luego, sentido.

La imagen neogótica conduce al desplazamiento y ampliación del significado originario de Pulsióname Fallócrata. Rápidamente podría aparecer una serie de colapsos de las nuevas posibilidades de significación traídas por esta forma de expresión gráfica: en este caso, se trata de una portada de disco, un título de una canción, el nombre de un grupo punk, y así por el estilo. Ha entrado en otro campo semántico, llevado de la mano de la tipografía proveedora de un ritmo sugerente que rompe la rigidez de la escritura.

Se produce de manera simultánea la ampliación del significado y su corrimiento metonímico hacia una determinada esfera de la cultura contemporánea, como es el metal y el punk, rodeados por la estética neogótica que le acompaña. Siguiendo a Wittgenstein se diría que la imagen encuentra el lugar de enunciación de la frase Pulsióname Fallócrata; es decir, nos permite imaginar en que contextos esta frase pudo decirse. Con facilidad se forma en nuestra mente la figura de un cantante de rock pesado aullando en la noche llena de ruido y de furia: Pulsióname Fallócrata… Pulsióname Fallócrata… Pulsióname Fallócrata.

La imagen no solo está enredada en el juego de volver presente lo implícito de las palabras. Inventa nuevos significados. Conduce y realiza el texto que, después de la imagen, ya no se interpretará en la soledad de la palabra. Por supuesto, la conexión realizada es parcial; tanto la palabra como la imagen son capaces de viajar a otras esferas y de juntarse con otros modos de expresión.

Se ha producido la fusión de mostrar y decir. La imagen que no cesa de decir; la palabra que no cesa de mostrarse. Un fenómeno tan profundamente cotidiano en los espacios digitales y en la publicidad generalmente vueltos invisibles precisamente por la eficacia de su funcionamiento.

En esta siguiente ejemplo, Figura 3, la imagen aun con una mayor economía de elementos logra desentrañar a cabalidad el significado de la frase: Asimisma ensimismada. Se ha producido como el caso anterior las correspondientes segmentaciones y selecciones textuales para trasladarlas al espacio gráfico.

El texto de Liz Luis Quiroga dice:

loop circuanular moebius que se llama a sí misma asimisma ensimismada lalengua elhabla reflexión pura desinencia sin rizoma hojas sueltas al viento ojos sueltos al viento bla bla bla

Y la imagen responde de la siguiente manera, permitiendo la emergencia de este doppelganger:

 

Figura 3. Asimisma Ensimismada.

El trabajo de la imagen sobre el texto produce un drástico cambio de sentido. La frase de partida está colocada en los ejes sintagmático y paradigmático referido a la lengua como un fenómeno autocontenido, cerrado en sí mismo y finalmente con una estructura circular. Cada palabra se define por el conjunto de otras palabras y no hay posibilidad de escapar del ámbito lingüístico.

La imagen de la Figura 3 nos habla del lenguaje y de su enclaustramiento. Utiliza este significado inicial con la finalidad de introducir una mirada femenina dada por la elección de la tipografía, fluida, móvil, nada precisa de la palabra asimisma. Un gesto profundamente reforzado por la aguja y el hilo apelando a una persona que se cose ella misma y que termina con esto ensimismada. La redundancia del proceso de volverse hacia dentro ocluyendo los ventanales viene dada por el término misma o por la mismidad tan llamativa en la imagen.

En este ejemplo, no se trata de un ejercicio puramente ilustrativo, sino del forzamiento de la estrategia metonímica. Cambio radical del referente, desplazamiento de la lengua a lo femenino o, quizás, descubrir en la lengua su género. Se podría sintetizar como la lengua de lo femenino, también ensimismada, asimismo cosida, siempre autorreferencial. Nótese que el español admite asimismo, pero no asimisma.

Una vez que la imagen ha introducido una distinción que estaba ausente en el texto se crea un campo marcado esta; es decir, se convierte en una forma productora que permite la emergencia de otras figuraciones, desplegando de este modo la imagen y llevando al texto original hacia nuevos espacios hasta ese momento desconocidos.

La imagen inicial actúa como el punto de partida para un campo de interpretaciones; se podría decir que la imagen actúa como el interpretante, en el sentido de Pierce y Eco; pero, es un interpretante visual. De la mano de este, se desarrollará un ámbito entero en donde nuevas imágenes ampliarán los significados originarles contenidos en el texto.

En el caso de la forma gótica que adquiere el segmento de Huelladegüella, como distinción formadora, comienza a indexarse en otros momentos de la conjunción entre texto y palabra, en la dinámica permanente de metonimia y nuevas visualidades; o, para ser más preciso, nuevas visualidades que trabajan metonímicamente sobre las palabras.

En este campo de posibilidades abiertas por el interpretante gótico, el siguiente paso indexa los textos en un contexto de la música metalera o punk, y propone una serie imaginaria de portadas de disco con esta temática. En la Figura 4, la imagen extrae solamente el qhuir you y lo transforma en el título del supuesto álbum de música.

m. Pero ¿qué mismo sostenía Dióscuro el antipapa? Probablemente una papaya, une pomme de terre linchada, tres sonajeros para entretener a los bebés trinitarios, seguro una copa de vino copto esto es una copta, una foto de la pirámide de Giza, sostiene diósoscuro que eran heterónimos lésbicoqueernobinarios dersusala teología qhuir you sostiene dióscuro que el impío Marciano le dijo:

a. Cuando pronuncio una palabra, me contestas con dos

 

Figura 4.

La elección de una estética informalista, marcada por el contraste blanco/negro, torna presente, de manera brutal, la afirmación de la genericidad queer, con todo lo que implica en la sociedad actual. Sin embargo, la imagen no solo vuelve patente el hecho queer, sino que amplía el campo semántico del término, recurriendo a la ambigüedad del lenguaje.

La palabra inventada qhuir es idéntica en su pronunciación que queer; al hacer este ejercicio lingüístico mantiene la referencia a lo queer e introduce un nuevo significado, al incorporar la palabra huir dentro de queer. Así, el término funde en un solo movimiento el señalamiento de la identidad queer con la huida, quizás mostrando la dificultad de asumir esta genericidad, que lleva a fenómenos de ocultamiento. Este giro se ve reforzado por el señalamiento qhuir you, en donde el you puede ser tanto celebratorio como condenatorio. Y todo esto se percibe directamente, de una sola mirada, y no a través de este largo razonamiento, cuestión que viene después de la percepción de la imagen.

El siguiente movimiento que hace la imagen es convertir la idea central Qhuir, Figura 5, en un conjunto de títulos de canciones que están dentro del álbum. Se sigue el mismo procedimiento de colapsar en un solo término, al menos dos significados, lo que se captan de una sola vez. Se inicia la construcción de un vocabulario que amplía la duplicidad ya contenida en Qhuir you.

Figura 5

 

Cuadro 1. Ampliación del campo semántico

Tucontututu	Referencia a un travestí, con tutú, y la soledad de uno consigo mismo, tú con tú
Atrabesar	Al cambiar la v por la b, funde el beso con el hecho de atravesar al otro
Escorpiamame	Amor y dolor del amor unido con el escorpión
Lujauria	Muestra la magnitud de la lujuria al unirla con jauría
Eternimiedad	La banalidad de lo eterno
Memiramenti	Mirarse en el otro como acto de amor y mentira a la vez

 

En la Figura 6, la imagen selecciona el término Rhumor, nuevamente para resaltar la unión de dos significados que, en el lenguaje ordinario, los encontramos separados; aquí rumor y humor forman una palabra nueva, que a pesar de todo la reconocemos como si fuera familiar.

lenguas de juego en el zócalo leguas de griterío asolando rhumor rhumor y en la plaza vaciada laura en la in.solación se entrega a la carnícula manos dev.oradoras imploran y ella roza las oraciones trova salsa merengue las yeguas del ego como saltimbanquos se en ardecen laura se consumerge /alea llacta est/

Figura 6

La elección de la estética para rhumor coloca la palabra en blanco sobre un claroscuro, indicando que el rhumor se encuentra siempre en una penumbra y que tiene la connotación de algo que no sabe de dónde viene ni quién lo enuncia; por eso, allí hay una persona recortada, que no sabemos quién es ni qué hace en ese lugar.

Figura 7

La contraportada del disco introduce en la estética difusa del rhumor, Figura 7, el aspecto del humor, fundiendo los dos significados en una serie de variantes que, de este modo, refuerzan la aparición de nuevos sentidos, que se desprenden de la unión de los dos términos.

Cuadro 2. Rhumor

Cut cut cuchillita maurillera	Construcción de una sonoridad, tómese en cuenta que es el nombre de una canción
Cat cat navajita sueca	Variación de la primera canción, que reemplaza cut cut por cat cat
Los secuaces más adentro	Probable referencia a una historia relacionado con el rhumor
Cuclillo afilado	Desplazamiento de cuchillo a cuclillo, manteniendo afilado; esto es, un pájaro afilado
Sencuentra conmideseo	Fusión de palabras para acentuar el encuentro y el deseo
Lagartos acústicos	Bien podría ser el nombre de un grupo de rock

 

La relación entre palabra e imagen en estos ejercicios sobre Huelladegüella de Liz Quiroga escapan a esta relación dual y proponen su rebasamiento. Los sentidos no funcionan solos o aislados. Ver provoca inmediatamente una serie de estímulos tanto en las áreas verbales como en las sonoras del cerebro. Los sentidos y las sensibilidades se contagian entre sí, aunque no siempre seamos conscientes de estos procesos neurológicos.

Aquí se produce la conjunción del neogótico de las imágenes, incluidas las portadas de discos y títulos de canciones, con los textos experimentales y extraen de estos su lado más áspero. De este modo, se inventa una canción punkera a partir de los contenidos de la obra literaria y se descubre dentro de ella el profundo sentido rítmico que la habita; en realidad, la combinación de ritmos y arritmias.

 

 

 

 

FORM AND ESSENCE IN PLATO

 

The path to a definition of the notion of form necessarily passes through Plato, who places this theme from the beginning of his works and will progressively give it a central role in his philosophical system. Reflections on form inevitably return to this matrix, so it is necessary to take a position on its conceptions. The approach made in this work does not intend to reconstruct the endless debates around Plato, an impossible question given its breadth. For this reason, it focuses exclusively on establishing, in a synthetic way, the nucleus of Plato's theory of form, which serves as an input for its contemporary elucidation.

I take as a reference two current reflections that I consider to shed light on a correct way of understanding the Platonic form: the relationship between form and essence, as proposed by Vasilis Politis; and the transformations that form undergoes in Plato's last dialogues, especially in the Parmenides and in The Sophist, analyzed by Cordero.  In order to contextualize these visions of Plato, one can consult the work of Larsen and Politis. (Politis, Plato's Essentialism: Reinterpreting the Theory of Forms, 2021) (Cordero, 2016)(Larsen & Politis, 2025)

The first sentence of Politis's text enunciates the central thesis of his work, around which his interpretation of Plato will revolve: form and essence are the same; that is, essence is form. This argument is based on the understanding that the essence asks about the ti esti, what is it? and does not attempt anything other than to answer this question.

The topic of the present study is Plato's theory of Forms, as it used to be called. The thesis of the study is that Plato's Forms simply are essences and that Plato's theory of Forms is a theory of essence – essences, in the sense of what we are committed to by the supposition that the ti esti ('What is it?') question can be posed and, all going well, answered. This thesis says that the characteristics that, as is generally recognised, Plato attributes to Forms, he attributes to them because he thinks that it can be shown that essences, on the original and minimal sense of essence, must be so characterized. (Politis, Plato's Essentialism: Reinterpreting the Theory of Forms, 2021, pág. 1)

Although this thesis is clearly based on this correct sense of essence, which inquires about what a thing is, or what makes a thing what it is, it leaves its relationship with form unanswered. Why does the fact of asking about the essence mean introducing the question of the form? The conclusion that follows from this reasoning is that the question of essence is equivalent to the question of form. In other words, answering the what a thing is means recognizing the form behind it as its essence. Everything that exists is formed in some way.

This relationship between form and essence can be clarified by clarifying that essence gives itself in beings as form; thus, discovering its essence is the same as recognizing the form that makes it what it is; that is, the essence has this formative function. It is assumed that, insofar as entities have an essence, they simultaneously possess a form. Moreover, the conclusion resulting from this reasoning leads to the expression that, if everything has an essence, then everything has a form. The formless, just as non-being, as will be seen later, exists in a relational way; that is, this reality is formless with respect to this other reality; but, in itself, it is not.

This question of the identity between form and essence is evident when looking at any object in daily life, in which answering the question of what it is is generally simple; However, when it comes to questions such as goodness, truth, beauty, and justice, the question becomes very difficult. In these cases, we are required to make extensive and in-depth considerations to answer the question, and the answers given are always disputed. Thus, the form of justice requires a careful investigation to know what its essence is.

If there is one thing that Socrates, as Plato represents him, is convinced of, it is that the ti esti question, especially when asked of certain things or qualities, such as beauty, equality, unity, justice, is a most important and profoundly difficult one, the answering of which is a major undertaking and requires demanding enquiry. (Politis, Plato's Essentialism: Reinterpreting the Theory of Forms, 2021, pág. 2)

Once this first consideration has been given, which intersects essence, form and the question "What is it?", Plato demands that the answer to this question be unitary and explanatory. These two necessary requirements refer to a much more complicated problem, which arises from the existence of the multiple, in respect of which the essence is unity; that is, entities that share the same essence and that, for this reason, are the same, similar or belong to the same field of phenomena without necessarily being identical.

If we observe that one reality p has the essence r, and that another reality q has the essence r, and so on with a series of objects, we must admit that several realities may have the same essence; but this essence does not arise by means of inductive procedures, but goes beyond the concrete fact; and, therefore,  The answer through the exemplar to the question what is it becomes insufficient; in the same way, the question "What is color?" is not solved by saying that this object is red or green. The essence of color covers the set of all colors.

In addition to their unitary character, essences must have an explanatory character. The essences that make a thing what it is are enough to make it possible for that thing to be what it is. The essence gives the entity the attributes and characteristics that make it what it is: "Plato associates further substantive requirements with the This is you question; in particular, the answer to the question must be unitary, and it must be explanatory". (Politis, Plato's Essentialism: Reinterpreting the Theory of Forms, 2021, pág. 2)

The next step that tends to be taken almost automatically is to interpret Plato following Aristotle's elaborations; the essence is quickly linked to the substance; but we must remain in the direct definition of essence, as a form that makes a thing what it is, without presupposing or conferring existence on that of which it is essence: "For it follows from this that, against a common understanding of Plato's Forms, we have no reason at all to suppose that Forms are substances that have essences; all we have reason to suppose is that they simply are essences. I shall conclude the present study with this result and add that this shows that Plato's Forms are not self(Aristóteles, 1994)-predicative, or self-predicative in the way they would be if they were substances having essences and distinct from their essence." . For example, a unicorn can be said to have the properties x,y,z, without this implying its effective existence; it is possible to elaborate in detail what justice is, even if the world is fundamentally unjust. (Politis, Plato's Essentialism: Reinterpreting the Theory of Forms, 2021, pág. 11)

As Politis points out, the discussion at stake here lies in sustaining the possibility of a theory of essence that does not include a definition of substance and that presupposes the existence of a first principle, from which everything else originates; therefore, it is necessary to rescue the possibility of a different path from the Aristotelian one: "To assume this is to assume that there can be no theory of essence except in combination with a theory of primary being and the view that the primary beings are substances: a monumental assumption.". (Politis, Plato's Essentialism: Reinterpreting the Theory of Forms, 2021, pág. 12)

For a configuration of the sense of essence and form, this aspect will be crucial, especially because it allows the use of the notion of essence by removing the substantialist burden that is placed on it; even more, affirming the need for the correct use of the term essence, as we can see in authors such as Marx in the analysis of the form-value as foundation and essence, and in Spivak with his strategic use of the term essence. Therefore, the full validity of a non-substantialist essence, which allows the understanding of the same or similar phenomena, can be sustained; otherwise, reality would dissolve into the difference. Essence as form explains both sameness and difference. (Marx, 1975) (Spivak, 2012)

The question of forms, as essences that they are, is conceived in Plato in a differentiated way depending on the type of things that are being dealt with. Four spheres are distinguished: those things like unity and plurality, and justice, goodness, and goodness, which are independent of sensible perception, and which, in fact, cannot be grasped by the senses, but only by reasoning. We cannot observe the good, the truth, or the justice, because they are not a quality of sensible things; We can establish that a fact is just or unjust, but there is no justice as a universal. And the other two, which are certain attributes such as water or fire, and what are later called accidents, which are attached to things and cannot be separated from them.

In putting this question to Socrates – the question of whether, in regard of certain things, there are separate Forms of those things – Parmenides distinguishes between four sorts of things in regard of which this question can raised: i. Things such as likeness and unlikeness, unity and plurality: Are there separate Forms of those things, that is, separate from sense-perceptible things that are like or unlike each other, or that are unitary or not unitary? ii. Things such as justice, goodness, and beauty: Are there separate Forms of those things, that is, separate from sense-perceptible things that are just or good or beautiful? iii. Things such as water, fire or human beings: Are there separate Forms of those things, that is, separate from sense-perceptible fire, water and human beings? Finally, iv. Things such as mud, hair, and dirt: Are there separate Forms of those things, that is, separate from sense-perceptible mud, dirt, and hair?(Politis, Plato on Essences and Forms, 2025, pág. 489)

Of course, Plato does not arrive at the conception of forms that produce forms, although he has to admit that concrete things have forms and that these can be pointed out to answer the question What is it? This aspect of form theory will come much later, especially from the hand of George Spencer Brown.  Rather, it is recorded the variety of essences and the diversity of their relationships depending on the type of entities with which we are dealing, including those ideal principles such as goodness, truth and justice. (Spencer Brown, 1972)

The theory of the Platonic form, thus formulated, still poses challenges for its understanding and, above all, for its contemporary use. Politis points out the main characteristics of the form:

Forms are changeless, uniform, not perceptible by the senses, knowable only by reasoning, the basis of causation and explanation, distinct from sense-perceptible things, necessary for thought and speech, separate from physical things. (Politis, Plato's Essentialism: Reinterpreting the Theory of Forms, 2021, pág. 1)

At this point, it is interesting to deal with the first characteristic, because taking it as it is formulated, it leads to an unacceptable metaphysics, because it transforms the essence into something fixed and separate from reality, and could lead to it being interpreted as a substance: Forms are changeless. I return to the approaches of Néstor Luis Cordero, in order to analyze the changes that the theory of form undergoes in Plato, in the Parmenides and, especially, in the Sophist, which provide a distinct image of the form and introduce into it the possibility of movement and change. (Cordero, 2016) (Platón, Parménides, 1992) (Platón, Sofista, 1992)

The problems arise in Plato at the moment in which he tries to explain those aspects that are not compatible with the monistic vision derived from Parmenides, because the contrast between being is and non-being is not seems insurmountable: sameness and difference, unity and multiplicity, truth and falsehood, reason and sensibility, among others. In the final analysis, how can we explain that there are things that are, how can we say of something that is not, that it is?

Plato enters fully into the development of an ontology, maintaining the fundamental finding of essence as form, and its non-substantialist character. The passage from what is to what exists and how it exists, implies radical transformations in its conception of form. In this context, Plato explicitly formulates the relationship between form and being, because he discovers the form of being; or, in other words, that being is a form.

Ext. — The former, slipping into the darkness of non-being, actsin combinationwith it, and it is difficult to distinguish it because of the darkness of the place, is it not?

Teet. - It seems so.

Ext. -The philosopher, on the other hand, always relating himself to the form of being by means of reasoning, alsopoco is fáIt is easy to perceive, this time because of the luminosity of the region.ón. The eyes of the soul of most people, in fact, are incapable of striving to look at the divine. (254a) (Platón, Sofista, 1992, pág. 435)

 

In Cordero's terms, "the philosopher is an 'ontologist', an expert in the Form of Being, to the point of being 'clinging' to it", and this will be a crucial finding, because it allows, at the same time, to resolve the difficulties of a fixed form and confer movement on it, and, on the other hand, being as a form, to participate fully in its characteristics. Plato thus arrives at an ontology of form. (Cordero, 2016, pág. 175)

 

Being as a form has the capacity to communicate; In fact, communication is the way in which being gives existence to that which only had essence. The communicability of forms breaks his isolation and prepares him to fully explain the reality before him, such as the existence of movement and rest, or of unity and multiplicity. 

 

Ext. —Since it has been admitted that some genders agree to communicate with each other and others do not, that some do so with a few and others with many... (254b) (Platón, Sofista, 1992, pág. 435)

Conferring being is, above all, a movement of communication between forms; moreover, in the beautiful words of Cordero, communicates existence: "The Form of Being, as was the case with the Form of the Good, is functional, it does not have a precise essence (such as beauty, justA little girlñez): it is purely dynamic, it communicates existence". (Cordero, 2016, pág. 175)

Participation, which is another fundamental characteristic of forms, makes possible the relationship between elements that, otherwise, appear to be totally isolated and without the capacity to interrelate. In this way, the crucial question of the relationship between the intelligible and the sensible would remain unresolved. The ability to communicate includes participation; that is, the two planes participate in the form of being and, through it, manage to communicate.

Either Form participates, or it does not exist. And since the capacity to communicate (to act or to be affected) concerns everything, on pain of not existing, there is no longer any distinction – as we have seen – between the sensible and the intelligible. Through participation and presence, the sensible and the intelligible participate in many ways.tumente; thanks to communicationóNot recíproca the Forms communicate with each otherí (selectively, lólogically) and, without the need to justify it, since PlatóI didn't always admit itó, the sensible communicates with the sensible. (Cordero, 2016, pág. 176)

Plato is finally confronted with the problem of non-being, since he has admitted that non-being exists in some way. If being is sameness and non-being, what is different, what does non-being consist of? It insists on maintaining Parmenides' thesis that non-being is not; but a nuance is introduced that alters Parmenidean monism and opens it to the understanding of negativity.

Ext. — We must admit, then, and without getting angry, that change is the same and not the same. When we say that he is the same and not the same, we do not speak in the same sense, but we affirm that he is the same when we refer to his participation with the same in himself, and when we say that he is not-the-same, we allude to his communication with the different, thanks to which he separates himself from the same and becomes not the former.  but in something different. In this way, it is also correct to affirm that it is not-the-same. (256ab) (Platón, Sofista, 1992, pág. 443)

If it is maintained that non-being is not, what is it that is named as the non-same, that is, the non-being, the different. Plato introduces the relational variant of non-being: there is no such thing as non-being in general, but there are things that are not. In order that this may not lead to a contradiction, it is interpreted as one thing that is not in relation to another, although it, by itself, has its own essence. Thus, the non-white only exists in relation to the white, and could not be sustained in isolation.

The main consequence of the Foreigner's comment on the carácter “relative” of the Different (for nothing is Different in itselfí; A t is neededéThe term of comparison) will be the confirmation of the only predicative value of the non-being that will be reached... As Bluck (1975: 148) observed: "Cases of Difference are necessarily relative [relational] and, consequently, the Different in itself, qua paradigmatic norm [standard], is necessarily relative [relational]" (Cordero, 2016, pág. 185)

The turn incorporated by Plato allows, at the same time, to save Parmenides' premise, being is and non-being is not, and, on the other hand, to establish the mode of existence of things that are not. From a certain perspective, something can be said to be not, but only in relation to something that is. Negativity arises in opposition to a positivity that, as such, is already given. Thus, falsehood is the denial of a truth; but, if it were completely isolated, it would be meaningless.

The implications for the debates on nothingness, as a metaphysical resource that is repeated throughout the history of philosophy, reveal the absolute impossibility of nothingness; and that any discourse around it should be considered as the negation of everything that exists. Nothingness by itself is meaningless and nothing can be stated or predicated about it; on the other hand, it is possible to have a discourse or to endow it with a function if it is opposed to the given, effectively existing reality. This is the value of nihilism; and the marking of the limits of the apophatic pathways.

Synthetically, the findings of Plato's theory of form are:

The essence answers the question : what is it? And this is the core of its definition.

Essence is a form. Form and essence are the same.

The use of the term essence does not imply a substantialist conception of reality.

On the ontological plane, being is form: a way of being.

The main characteristics of the way of being are communicability and participation, which resolve the question of being and non-being; and, therefore, of movement and rest, unity and plurality, sensible and intelligible.

The essence answers the question : what is it? And this is the core of its definition.

Non-being is not; but there are things that are not. This non-being of things occurs only in relational terms. Non-being as such does not exist; something is not with respect to something that is, as its negation.

 

These elements must be taken into account, debated and transformed, in order to be integrated into a general theory of form, which is contemporary and which accounts for the current demands of this theory; For example, how can these Platonic considerations of essence and form be incorporated and redefined if form is claimed to be the introduction of a distinction? Can it be maintained that essence is that which introduces a distinction?

 

Bibliography

Aristóteles. (1994). Metafísica. (T. Calvo Martínez, Trans.) Madrid: Gredos.

Cordero, N. (2016). Platón contra Platón: La autocrítica del Parménides y la ontología del Sofista. Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires: Editorial Biblos.

Larsen, P., & Politis, V. (Eds.). (2025). The Platonic Mind. London; New York: Routledge.

Marx, K. (1975). El Capital (Vol. Tomo I/Vol.I). (P. Scaron, Trans.) México: Siglo XXI.

Platón. (1992). Parménides. In Platón, Diálogos (Vol. V, pp. 7-136). Madrid: Gredos.

Platón. (1992). Sofista. In Platón, Diálogos (Vol. V, pp. 319-482). Madrid: Gredos.

Politis, V. (2021). Plato's Essentialism: Reinterpreting the Theory of Forms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Politis, V. (2025). Plato on Essences and Forms. In P. Larsen, & V. Politis (Eds.), The Platonic Mind. London; New York: Routledge.

Spencer Brown, G. (1972). Laws of form. New York: Julian Press Inc.

Spivak, G. C. (2012). An aesthetic education in the era of globalization. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.